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I.  Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been an ongoing process of decentralization in Germany with a 
decline in sectoral agreements (Flachentarifverträge). The formal erosion of these central 
wage agreements apart, the path toward decentralization is less transparent; for example, 
many companies still pay above the wages agreed to in regional and industry-level 
agreements, there is no obvious sign of a sustained growth in firm-level agreements 
(Firmentarifverträge), and many firms though not bound by collective agreements still  orient 
themselves toward sectoral agreements. The German system of industrial relations continues 
to be characterized by its extensive juridification, framework of binding collective 
agreements, and encompassing interest organizations on both sides of the labor market. It is 
moreover a dual system of interest representation, of codetermination and collective 
bargaining. But although few would claim today that Germany’s basic industrial relations 
system remains intact (e.g. Klikauer, 2002), there is lingering ambiguity concerning the facts 
of the case – let alone their determinants – allowing for  disagreement as to the consequences 
of the erosion that has been observed.1  
The British industrial relations system differs in a number of fundamental respects 
from its German counterpart. First, it remains a system in which employers are largely free to 
choose how they engage with employees and how they associate with one another.2 There are 
few formal requirements placed upon employers to negotiate, consult, or inform employees 
over employment relations matters. Those rules that do exist tend to originate at European 
level and have the greatest impact on transnational corporations.  Second, certain auxiliary 
legislation that supported employees’ bargaining rights – such as that which extended the 
terms of bargaining agreements to uncovered workers in the public sector – were removed in 
the 1980s. As a result, there is very little statutory underpinning to collective bargaining and 
that which does exist – such as the statutory recognition procedure – is largely a dead-letter. 
Third, because of this framework, there is little necessity for employers to seek derogations 
from sectoral bargaining arrangements. And while it is possible under statute for employers 
to permit collective agreements to be directly legally binding (via the 1992 Trade Unions and 
Labour Relations Consolidation Act)3 this does not happen in practice. Instead, collective 
agreements take legal effect as implied terms in employees’ contracts of employment.  
Fourth, the peak social partners are relatively weak in Britain. Employer association 
membership is low and declining and employer associations have traditionally been very 
weak, with a few notable exceptions such as the Chemical Industries Association and the 
Engineering Employers’ Federation. As a consequence, there is little coordination in 
bargaining arrangements across employers, and bargaining coverage tends to be low. Even a 
quarter century ago, sectoral agreements were the principal method of pay determination in 
only one-sixth of private sector workplaces and they declined dramatically through to the late 
1990s (Brown, Bryson, and Forth, 2009: 34). In short, sectoral bargaining was already a 
spent force in Britain by the time our analysis begins in 1998. Finally, because the system is 
highly decentralized, fragmented and uncoordinated, British unions tend to focus their 
organizing activity at workplace or organization level, rather than sectorally or nationally. 
Nor for that matter do they share responsibility for workplace governance issues with works 
councils. Rather, Britain has joint consultative committees (JCCs) which are voluntary 
                                                 
1 For contrasting evaluations of the outcome of the process of decentralization, see Ochel (2003) and Massa-
Wirth and Niechoj (2004). 
2 This is not to deny the fact that a process of ‘juridification’ has occurred which is continually shaping what 
was once a voluntaristic system (Dickens and Hall, 2009). 
3 See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1992/ukpga_19920052_en_11#pt4-ch1-pb2-l1g179 
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structures usually set up at the behest of management and with little or no authority derived 
from statutory arrangements.4 Consequently, British unions seek to address the full range of 
workplace-related issues as they impinge upon the pay and conditions of employees. 
The goal of the present exercise is to update research on the facts of the case in both 
countries (even though we only cover the interval 1998-2004 because of our cross-country 
focus), to chart transitions between collective bargaining states, and seek to account for the 
resulting collective bargaining structure. That is to say, we will first examine the course of 
collective bargaining (including the erosion of multiemployer bargaining and the expansion 
of sectors without collective bargaining) and worker representation (including works councils 
and Joint Consultative Committees) in greater detail than has previously been undertaken in 
any comparative study of Germany or Britain before turning to a descriptive examination of 
transitions between states over our common sample period and thence an analysis of their 
correlates and the 2004 status quo ante.  
 
 
II.  Backdrop 
 
Historically, centralized bargaining (or, more accurately, regional industry-wide bargaining) 
has been the key form of collective bargaining in Germany, covering some 90 percent of all 
employees. As Schnabel, Zagelmayer, and Kohaut (2006: 168) note, things first began to 
change in the early 1970s with the emergence of what they term “qualitative bargaining 
policy,” namely sectoral agreements that sought to accommodate improvements in working 
life and the protection of employees against dislocations caused by rationalization and 
technical change. Such provisions – first tackling changes in the organization of work and 
subsequently in the flexibility of working time – were to be implemented at local level. 
Thence, in the 1990s, under the pressures of globalization, high unemployment, and 
unification, all aspects of the system of collective bargaining are widely characterized in the 
German literature as having being subject to more or less serious erosion if not actual crisis 
(e.g. Artus, 2001). Thus, employers were increasingly resigning from employers’ associations 
(Silvia and Schroeder, 2007), trade union strength was declining rapidly (Addison, Schnabel, 
and Wagner, 2007), and the coverage of collective bargaining was shrinking (Kohaut and 
Schnabel, 2001). Moreover, the coverage of that other pillar of the German dual system – the 
works council (see below) – was also subject to erosion (Hassel, 1999). 
But in response to these challenges German collective bargaining was decentralizing. 
In part, this took the form of a rising number of company agreements – which increased from 
2,550 in 1990 to 6,415 in 2001 – as many firms dropped out of the centralized system. A 
more important and sustained tendency, however, has been the growth of decentralization in 
sectoral agreements through the device of ‘opening clauses’ (Öffnungklauseln) that have 
allowed firms more flexibility through locally-negotiated adjustments to centrally-agreed 
working time and wages (Bispinck, 2004). The former adjustments allowed increases or 
decreases in working time and alterations to work schedules. The latter permitted reductions 
in wages or a suspension/withdrawal of wage improvements and/or working time adjustments 
involving wage changes (Hassel, 1999: 496-497). Of the two, agreements on working time 
                                                 
4 It is notable that when the U.K. government enacted the Information and Consultation of Employees 
Regulations, which brought into force at EU requirement for employers to consult employees, they did so in 
such a way that employers were able to fulfill this commitment through direct communication methods – so that 
representative structures were unnecessary. Health and safety committees and representatives are exceptional in 
the British case: their status is underpinned by a strong tripartite system of statutory regulation. However, here 
we follow the traditional approach of excluding single-issue committees such as health and safety committees 
from our definition of joint consultative committees. 
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reductions (without compensation) were the more common (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2006). We 
note parenthetically that a nonretrospective question on such opt-out clauses was first asked 
in the dataset used here (the IAB Establishment Panel) in 2005, just outside the time frame of 
the present study. But given that opening clauses well preceded 2005 their potential influence 
will be accommodated using industry dummies, the maintained hypothesis being that they 
offer a means of stemming the erosion of centralized bargaining by better aligning outcomes 
to firm-specific needs  
To complicate matters, so-called plant-level “pacts for employment and 
competitiveness” (betriebliche Bündnisse für Arbeit [und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit]) have also 
proliferated in recent years (Berthold et al., 2003; Rehder, 2003). Such agreements have also 
led to more flexible work rules and working time as well as reductions in total compensation. 
Although partially guided by opening clauses, they apply to covered and uncovered 
companies alike. The consensus view appears to be that while opening clauses represent a 
trend to organized decentralization, pacts though no less a response to the economic condition 
of the firm, at least represent a different dynamic: a new normal regulatory instrument. At 
issue is the extent to which such agreements if not in actual contravention of sectoral labor 
contracts are in fact destabilizing (see Seifert and Massa-Wirth, 2005). The point is that while 
concession bargaining of this type typically operates within the framework of sectoral 
agreements it may create pressures leading companies to leave the system altogether – which 
effects might be long delayed and not yet evident in data on the structure of bargaining (and 
certainly over the time interval examined here.) As a practical matter, our dataset contains 
retrospective information on pacts in the 2006, 2008 and 2009 waves, although this 
information is not used here on grounds of consistency with the earlier question on opt-out 
clauses. As before, any influence of such institutional innovations is captured via industry 
dummies.  
Recently, employer associations have also responded to the challenge of membership 
losses via a new form of membership affiliation known as membership “without collective 
bargaining ties” (ohne Tarifbindung) (see Silvia and Schroeder, 2007: 1453-1455). Such 
affiliations allow members to take advantage of the relevant association’s legal, lobbying, and 
personnel services without having to pay the contractual wage. By the same token, such 
members are not shielded from union efforts to extract a local agreement and they cannot 
collect strike insurance benefits as can regular members. This new membership form is 
common in the metals, plastics, and woodworking industries and is popular among small 
firms. Silvia and Schroeder note that about one-quarter of member firms in metalworking 
(employing around 10 percent of workers in that sector) have this form of membership as 
well as some one-third of all firms in the textile employer associations where losses of 
membership have been most acute. Further, in eastern Germany the majority of members in 
many regional employer associations have this status. Such membership developments do of 
course fall squarely within our sample period but our data contain no information on their 
incidence. Once again, their effects will be recouped through industry dummies. 
Finally, mention might also be made of so-called “quick notice agreements.” German 
law requires any company leaving an employers’ association to adhere to all contracts signed 
by that association when the company was still a member for the duration of those contracts. 
Employer associations of late have begun to offer quick notice agreements that allow 
members to leave an association upon demand, even after a provisional agreement with the 
unions has been reached but prior to its authorization. Although quick notice may have 
alleviated some of the anxiety of nervous managers about being trapped in a bad contract, 
Silvia and Schroeder (2007: 1453) contend that it has not stopped the slide in sectoral 
agreements, arguing that those associations with such agreements do not seem to have 
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declined noticeably slower than those without them; and further caution that the option has 
rarely been exercised. 
In sum, after sharp falls in industry-wide bargaining (by the start of our sample period 
the number of employees covered by sectoral agreements had fallen to 68 (51) percent in 
western (eastern) Germany), recent innovations in collective bargaining may well have 
blunted further erosion in the number of establishments and workers covered by sectoral 
agreements and/or neutralized any trend toward increasing company bargaining proper. This 
is not to deny that the process of decentralization is ongoing. Indeed, the direct evidence is to 
the contrary. Thus, there are very few sectors where opening clauses have not been agreed 
upon. For example, as of 2005 around 13 percent of establishments in the IAB Establishment 
Panel covered by collective bargaining stated that their collective agreements contained 
opening clauses and about one-half of these establishments had made use of them. 
Furthermore, pacts for employment have provided the basis for yet further decentralization: a 
2003 survey of works councils indicated that such pacts were in existence at about 23 percent 
of German companies with at least 20 employees (the proportion was much greater – at 46 
percent –  in establishments with over 1,000 employees). The principal issue is whether this 
decentralization is planned or destabilizing. And even where not destabilizing the ability of 
the system to meet the needs of decentralization confronts the issue of workplace 
representation through the agency of the works council, that other pillar of the dual system of 
interest representation comprising unions and works councils.  
As we have seen, unified unions organize entire sectors and industries and negotiate 
industry-wide collective agreements. For their part, work councils are elected at plant level 
and represent the interests of all employees in the plant, not just union members. They enjoy 
relatively extensive powers, extending to codetermination rights, but not covering wage 
negotiations per se unless the bargaining parties at regional/industry level expressly cede 
them a role. That said, the wide-ranging influence of councils impart material de facto 
bargaining authority while over the course of time more conventional bargaining rights have 
accrued to them under both authorized/regulated and unauthorized decentralization. In other 
words, issues that were formerly dealt with only under collective bargaining are increasingly 
being addressed within the domain of works councils. At one level, then, works councils may 
be likened to Anglo-Saxon workplace unions even though the strike weapon is foreclosed to 
them. It follows that any discussion of collective bargaining necessitates analysis of the 
course of works council representation.  
Any decline in works councils (and of the union movement as well given their 
symbiosis)5 limits the regulative capacity of German industrial relations institutions; in 
particular, the ability of the German system to decentralize may be threatened while further 
undermining trade unions. In the present treatment, we will consider the factors underpinning 
works council presence and works council formation/dissolution noted in the works council 
literature (see, for example, Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 1997; Addison et al., 2003; 
Addison et al, 2004; Jirjahn, 2009). We will also consider the role of collective bargaining in 
this regard, although we do not here explore the union-works council nexus in any real detail.   
The attitude of the unions is also a constraint since it is hard to conceive of the needs 
of decentralized bargaining being best served by a situation in which the bargaining parties at 
sectoral level can exercise a right of veto as is the case with opening clauses. Finally, we have 
to recognize that the influence of collective bargaining extends well beyond its formal 
                                                 
5 On this symbiosis, see in particular the recent work of Behrens (2009) who examines on the basis of the fourth 
WSI survey of works councils the extent to which the entity is actively involved in the recruitment of union 
members based on such factors as union support, union strategies, works council union density, the presence of 
workplace union representatives as well as structural establishment and workforce characteristics. A wider 
discussion of the union-works council nexus is contained in Addison (2009). 
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competence or reach. This is because a very considerable number of uncovered 
establishments/employees are influenced by the wages set under sectoral agreements by 
virtue of the ‘orientation’ of their employers toward such agreements. Thus, our analysis 
must seek at least to document this behavior as distinct from the classical uncovered case. 
Despite the profound differences in the employment relations context charted earlier, 
the British private sector faces similar difficulties with respect to worker representation and 
collective bargaining as does Germany. Writing at the beginning of this decade, Millward, 
Bryson, and Forth (2000: 234), reflecting on the findings of a study tracking employment 
relations over the previous two decades, commented: “The system of collective relations, 
based on the shared values of the legitimacy of representation by independent trade unions 
and of joint regulation, crumbled … to such an extent that it no longer represents a dominant 
model.” Even where unions retained nominal bargaining rights, they were frequently 
overlooked in decision-making, and little or no negotiation over terms and conditions 
occurred. Commentators were to refer to unions as “hollow shells” (Hyman, 1997: 314; 
Millward, Bryson, and Forth, 2000: chapter 5; Brown et al., 1998). As a consequence, the 
financial state of British trade unions is parlous (Willman and Bryson, 2009), severely 
limiting their powers to service current members’ interests, let alone organize parts of the 
non-union sector. The tendency was therefore for new workplaces and new entrants to the 
labor force to be ‘born’ non-union (Machin, 2000; Willman et al., 2007), resulting in a rise in 
the proportion of all employees in the labor force who had never been union members. This 
trend was even apparent in organized workplaces (Bryson and Gomez, 2005).   
Union organizational weakness has manifested itself in a decline in the union wage 
premium (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2009) and, despite a more benign political climate under 
‘New Labour,’ a widespread perception of union ineffectiveness among union members and 
non-members alike (Bryson, 2007; Bryson and Forth, 2009).  Perhaps somewhat perversely, 
weaker unions may have been more attractive to employers as partners in organizational 
change and enhanced workplace performance.  Union capacity to organize industrial action 
seems to have diminished (Dix, Sisson, and Forth, 2009), and with it the last vestiges of fear 
among employers with which unions were viewed in the aftermath of the 1979 Winter of 
Discontent and the Miners’ Strike of the early 1980s. There is indeed new evidence to 
suggest that employers do perceive unions as helpful in improving workplace performance 
(Bryson and Forth, 2009), and there has been a diminution in union negative effects on 
profitability – such that these effects are no longer statistically significant (Blanchflower and 
Bryson, 2009). However, employers have supplemented and, in some places, supplanted 
unions through the creation and widespread adoption of non-union forms of two-way 
communication offering employees ‘voice’ through non-union channels (Willman, Gomez, 
and Bryson, 2009). Unlike the German case, where works councils provide a strong 
representative form of voice at the workplace for workers, British employers have placed the 
onus on direct communication mechanisms such as team briefings. Although they are the 
creation of employers, such mechanisms appear to enhance employee perceptions of 
managerial responsiveness to their needs and problems at the workplace (Bryson, 2004), 
potentially undermining the position of representative forms of worker voice such as trade 
unionism and joint consultative committees. (And, unlike works councils, it will be recalled 
that JCCs are voluntary rather than mandatory representative institutions, set up at the behest 
of management and not the workforce.)  
Britain differs from Germany in another important respect. Unlike German 
employers, their British counterparts are able to ‘mix and match’ pay bargaining strategies, 
including bargaining coverage at workplace, organization, and sectoral level.  However, 
although employers are at liberty to deploy different levels of bargaining, in practice, if there 
is any collective bargaining at all, it tends to be at a single-level (Bryson and Wilkinson, 
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2002). Such single-level bargaining reflects a more general trend towards the simplification 
of pay determination at workplace level (Kersley et al., 2006: 184). 
 
 
III.  Some Theoretical Reflections on Bargaining Structure 
 
Abstracting from macroeconomic considerations attendant upon the covariation of  
centralization (latterly, coordination) of the bargaining system and macro aggregates, 
centralized or at least more centralized wage agreements can be rationalized on a number of 
microeconomic grounds. The standard argument is that centralization creates homogeneous 
conditions for companies by taking the wage out of competition, providing comparable labor 
costs for all companies. More formally, transaction costs can be reduced by substituting 
collective negotiations for the plethora of individual bargains and through standardization of 
the terms and conditions of the employment relation. These savings in the costs of 
negotiation and regulation are said to be increasing in the degree of collective bargaining 
centralization and coverage. Further, as Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut (2006:172) point 
out, the transaction cost arguments may be stiffened by recourse to power considerations. 
Thus, they refer to the advantages to the employer side of being able to pool their resources 
when dealing with organized labor. Most obviously, employer organizations are designed to 
counter whipsawing – the picking off of employers one at a time. 
That said, the attraction of decentralization is that single-employer agreements (or 
individual contracts) have the obvious advantage of allowing the parties to tailor the 
agreement to the situation of the company or plant.  Establishment-specific problems can then 
more easily be taken into account. But if unions are organized at a different level or insiders 
have the power to dictate wages and conditions then more centralized contracting may be 
beneficial, implying that there may be some optimal level of centralization.   
External developments intrude on this scenario. In particular, the heightened 
competition from globalization challenges existing structures and choices of the regulatory 
framework. Globalization increases the need for operational flexibility (i.e. differentiated 
responses) in response to changing conditions in product and factor markets – the notion of 
increased heterogeneity in production strategies and labor practices. In such circumstances, as 
Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut note (2006: 173), “… the transaction-cost advantage of 
centralized arrangements decreases in favor of the informational and flexibility advantages of 
decentralized regulation.” The requirements of flexible and local decision-making confront 
the relatively rigid rules set by collective bargaining. One aspect of this is the widely 
observed employer withdrawal from employer associations, as well as the reticence of newly-
founded firms to join them (on the facts of the latter, see Kohaut and Ellguth, 2008, who 
further document the general course of collective bargaining coverage between 1996 and 
2007). 
Much research has in fact been devoted to the effect of economic change on employer 
associations. For example, Traxler (2004) has considered the ability of employer associations 
to weather collective action problems in the face of unfavorable economic conditions. In a 
cross-country setting he reports that institutional factors (of which the most important is the 
extension of multiemployer agreements to those employers not affiliated to the signatory 
employer association) are more important than economic factors (such as foreign trade 
dependence) as determinants of the level of employer density. This ties in of course with the 
varieties-of-capitalism model. However, economic change requires adjustment strategies on 
the part of employer associations, and Traxler observes that the functional adjustments (e.g. 
political lobbying, mergers, cuts in budgets, services, and dues, reorientation toward product 
market interests) have weakened them in relation to their constituency – if not labor unions. 
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Further, weakening of the core function of multiemployer bargaining threatens the 
withdrawal of government support (based on macroeconomic considerations) and at root the 
survival of employer associations. 
Traxler concludes importantly that supportive labor law has contained this risk by 
means of organized decentralization (see also Ochel, 2003, pp. 20-24). However, he cautions 
that the adjustment strategies followed by employer associations may exacerbate their 
problems in the long run while noting that decentralizing tendencies may become so 
dominant that multiemployer bargaining loses control of the process and ultimately fades 
away. A not dissimilar conclusion is offered in the very different treatment by Silvia and 
Schroeder (2009), who argue that the interests of large and small employers have diverged 
fundamentally since the mid-1980s with the attempt by the latter to shift the burden of 
adjustment to cost pressures on to the former, leading smaller employers to desert employer 
associations. The response of employer associations in the form of two-tiered membership 
and like measures is an attempt to bridge the gap. Not only is this narrative inconsistent with 
the predictions of the varieties-of-capitalism model but, if a tipping point has already been 
reached, it may also constitute support for the polar opposite position of the convergence 
(around an Anglo-Saxon model) thesis. 
Finally, we have not mentioned the effect of transnational economic integration on 
unions. Two points are in order here. First, there is broad consensus that unions have been 
impacted harder by the economic changes detrimental to collective action. Heightened 
unemployment and growing internationalization, so the argument runs, have exacerbated pre-
existing, pre-associational power asymmetries. Second, weakened unionism reduces the 
incentive to engage in multiemployer bargaining. Alternatively put, union decline strengthens 
the importance of the supportive role of labor law and provides the basis for Hassel’s (2002: 
316) conjecture: “If it were not for such political support, the erosion of the German system 
of industrial relations would be even more rapid and more pronounced. 
And what of that other form or worker representation, the works council? Transaction 
costs may be important here as well since works councils might lower communications costs 
in larger and likely more complex and hierarchical organizations. But theoretical 
considerations have mostly focused on the works council-collective bargaining nexus. One 
idea is that where a works council is embedded in a collective bargaining arrangement, the 
tendency of the works council agency to engage in rent-seeking behavior will be sharply 
constrained, leading it to concentrate on production rather than distribution issues. (Freeman 
and Lazear, 1995; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003) Thus, employers may be members of an 
employers association/participate in sectoral bargaining so as to limit rent seeking by the 
works council and take advantage of the pro-productive voice aspects of the entity. But works 
councils are elected by workers and not by management even if the latter can influence that 
decision (see section IV). And there are grounds for expecting a positive association between 
sectoral bargaining and works councils by reason of employee choice: works councils may 
need the support of unions to strategically shape outcomes (Wever, 1994). On the other hand, 
if they are seeking to extract rents, workers may see less value in voting in a works council in 
situations where there is a collective agreement in place. More generally, since works council 
rights are a function of employment size, workers should be less inclined to elect a council in 
smaller establishments.  
A very different view of works councils is that they are defensive agencies, so that 
workers might elect them to protect quasi rents they have created through investing in firm-
specific capital/training (Jirjahn, 2009). This time the opportunism is viewed as emanating 
from the employer side. Attention then shifts to the factors that might make employer 
opportunism more likely, such as transitory negative shocks and adverse economic situations 
more generally. On this view, works councils are likely to be introduced when workers 
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anticipate a financial crisis. Arguments such as a poor sales situation might thus be included 
alongside other suspects reflecting heightened uncertainties (such as those associated with 
certain payment systems, research-based market strategies, and ownership forms that 
encourage employer risk taking). 
 
 
IV.  Empirical Studies 
 
There have been comparatively few cet. par. investigations of the structure of collective 
bargaining in Germany despite the extended debate on decentralization. We focus here on the 
set of studies of Schnabel and colleagues since these are among the best known in charting 
changes in the structure of collective bargaining while using the same data set as do we. Key 
arguments deployed in this series of studies and the related literature (on which, see the 
references contained in Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut, 2006) include 
establishment/organizational size, establishment type, establishment age, workforce 
characteristics, form of ownership, and (proxies for) the nature of the employer association. 
The relevance of establishment/organization size is that the transaction costs of concluding 
individual contracts may be reduced by collective bargaining which may also reduce 
complexity and improve communications. And if larger plants are more likely to be 
unionized, there are advantages in collective action that may be underscored by the 
orientation of the latter or at least by the collective good of wage moderation.6 For its part, 
branch plant status likely reflects spillover effects from the parent company favoring 
collective bargaining (vis-à-vis independent establishments of similar size) 
Perhaps the most important reason for the inclusion of establishment age is a 
mechanical one: the very persistence of bargaining structures. Further, younger plants may 
need more flexible institutional structures first to survive and then to grow. For its part, 
homogeneity of the workforce may point to greater benefits from the standardization 
associated with centralization. Conversely, higher shares of (firm-specific) skilled workers 
may mean that solutions are best handled in house. That said, expectations might be reversed 
if the unskilled are less unionized or if lower skill levels limit the scope for opportunistic 
behavior and thence the need for collective regulation. Ownership of the company may be 
influential in a number of respects. In the first place, it is less likely that individually-owned 
businesses need follow a collective agreement on transaction cost grounds. Moreover, 
foreign-owned establishments may need to follow different institutional settings set from 
without. Finally, as our preceding discussion has suggested, the type of employers’ 
association may be important. In particular, associations offering opt-out clauses and more 
flexible forms of membership forms may stem membership losses. As a practical matter, 
however, lacking such information in regular data sets inferences have to be made on the 
basis of blunt industry dummies.   
With these preliminaries behind us, we next review studies by Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, 
and Kohaut (2006), and Kohaut and Schnabel (2001, 2003). Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and 
Kohaut (2006) provide a comparative study of the determinants of bargaining structure in 
Britain and Germany in 1998 and 2000, respectively. Since they report that more or less the 
same set of variables in the two countries are associated with firms’ choice of governance 
structure, we will focus on their results for Germany here. The authors’ ordered probit results 
suggest that the probability of multiemployer bargaining rises with establishment size 
(especially in eastern Germany, where a doubling in employment size from 100 to 200 
                                                 
6 Noting, however, that smaller employers may have a greater need to increase their collective bargaining 
power, Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut (2006) suggest using a quadratic in employment size.). 
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employees increases the probability of multiemployer bargaining by 6 percentage points), 
albeit at a decreasing rate. Branch plants are less likely to have no collective agreements and 
more likely to have multi-plant bargaining than are independent businesses. Newly-founded 
establishments are less likely to make use of multiemployer bargaining, while plants with 
larger shares of low-skilled workers are more likely to engage in multiemployer bargaining. 
Finally, foreign ownership has different effects in western and eastern Germany, increasing 
the probability of no collective bargaining in the former region and lowering it in the latter.       
Again using the IAB Establishment Panel, Kohaut and Schnabel (2001) provide a 
probit analysis of the determinants of applicability of a sectoral wage agreement, an ordered 
probit analysis of the applicability of contract type (where the dependent variable is an index 
taking the value of 4 for a sectoral agreement, 3 for a firm agreement, 2 for no collective 
bargaining per se but where the firm orients itself to a (sectoral) collective agreement, and 0 
where there is neither a collective agreement nor a process of orientation), and finally a probit 
analysis of the abandonment of a sectoral agreement. In each case the outcome year is 2000. 
The main results of the initial probit analysis is that the application of a sectoral agreement is 
positively associated with establishment size (although again at a decreasing rate), branch 
plant status, and (on this occasion) with the share of qualified workers, and negatively 
associated with the age of the establishment, its legal form (where it is an individually-owned 
firm), and foreign ownership (though not for eastern Germany). The factors that are 
associated with of a sectoral or multiemployer agreement presence assume opposite sign 
when it comes to their abandonment, although the effects are less well determined. In 
addition, firms are less prone to leave a sectoral agreement where a works council is present 
and where they already pay higher wages than laid down in that collective agreement. 
Finally, the authors’ ordered probit analysis suggests that formalization is more likely the 
larger the firm, among older and branch plants, and where the workforce is more qualified. 
Again as before, individually- and foreign-owned firms are less likely to apply (or refer to) 
contracts of any sort.  In their subsequent analysis of the application/abandonment of sectoral 
agreements, Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) obtain much the same set of results using data for 
2001 and pooled data for 1998-2001. 
Two final studies by Schnabel and colleagues might usefully be addressed in 
conclusion. First, Kohaut and Schnabel (2006) examine the prevalence of opening clauses in 
sectoral agreements and the extent to which they are utilized by firms. Using data from the 
2005 IAB Establishment Panel, the first to contain a question on such opt-out clauses, the 
authors note that 13 percent of covered establishments stated that their sectoral agreements 
contained opening clauses. Interestingly, however, a much larger share of these 
establishments were unaware of whether or not the sectoral agreement contained any such 
clause(s). Subject to this caveat, approximately, one-half of the establishments used such 
clauses. In examining the determinants of the use of the two types of opening clauses – 
adjustments to working time and (less commonly) reductions in wages – Kohaut and 
Schnabel report that poor profitability of the enterprise is a key initiator.7 The authors 
conclude that improved information about existing opening clauses as well as increases in 
their frequency might improve acceptance of the German system of collective bargaining and 
reduce the tendency of firms to withdraw from employer associations and hence sectoral 
bargaining.8 
                                                 
7 For a more detailed discussion focusing on the timing of opening clauses and the impact of the two types on 
wages in the manufacturing sector of Baden-Württemberg using the German Structure of Earnings Survey, see 
Heinbach (2007). 
8 For a parallel analysis of the determinants of pacts for employment and competitiveness based on the 2003 
WIC works council survey, see Ellguth and Kohaut (2008), Massa-Wirth and Niechoj (2004); Siefert and 
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In a separate study of contractual wage payments in excess of those fixed under 
sectoral bargaining (übertarifliche Entlohnung), Jung and Schnabel (2009) observe that 40 
percent of establishments covered by sectoral and firm-level agreements pay higher  wages 
than are stipulated in the relevant agreement. Although their main concern is with the 
determinants of the wage cushion (and, ultimately for technical reasons, with its presence), 
our interest is mainly in their more descriptive findings. Jung and Schabel report that 
establishments covered by firm agreements are significantly less likely to have wage 
cushions. The argument is of course that wage cushions are necessary to overcome the 
restrictions imposed by centralized agreements, whereas firm-level agreements are tailored to 
firm-specific conditions. Next, it is reported that the incidence of wage cushions has declined 
in recent years, along with the coverage of collective agreements. Finally, the excess of 
wages over contractual levels has also declined – from 48 percent in 2000 to 43 percent in 
2006. The authors’ interpretation is interesting: centralized bargaining has become more 
dominant to the extent that fewer firms deviated from the sectoral contract. 
In the light of the above, it seems that there are grounds for anticipating a positive 
(negative) association between establishment size and age (foreign ownership) and 
formalization (i.e. collective bargaining, ignoring for the moment the distinction between 
single-firm and multiemployer agreements). There is some theoretical suggestion that a more 
homogenized and in particular less skilled labor force should be associated with collective 
bargaining, although this relation may be undercut/reversed by the insider behavior or 
unionization of more skilled groups. Single plants (as opposed to branch plants) may also on 
the basis of practical considerations and past research be expected to have less recourse to 
formalization and the same may be true of individually-owned enterprises although here there 
may be a positive association with works council formation on managerial pressure grounds. 
We include all such arguments and a range of others. First, we deploy a much wider 
range of workforce characteristics (shares of female workers, part-timers, and fixed-term 
contract workers, as well as skilled workers). This is partly because we are also interested in 
examining the determinants of (changes in) works council status.  But the use of atypical 
workers in particular may give plants an added degree of freedom and other things equal 
weaken the tendency to leave collective agreements. Similarly, expected increase in sales 
may give more room for maneuver. By the same token, they may also lessen the attraction of 
works councils to workers (see below). 
Higher shares of exports in output, greater product market competition, R&D and 
advanced technology might all mirror the expected association between foreign ownership 
and collective bargaining. Differences in export propensity limit product commonalities and 
employment standardization needs of employers, heightened competition strengthens the 
importance of differentiated responses, while technological and structural change may further 
affect companies (and also occupational groups) differently and elevate the informational and 
flexibility advantages of decentralized regulation.  
The trend toward organizational change at the workplace – as manifested in a 
decentralization of decision making (delegation of responsibilities, introduction of team-work 
and profit-centers) – might also be expected to require greater flexibility  than permitted by 
the rules set under centralized (strictly sectoral) bargaining, subject to the opt-out clauses 
mentioned earlier. Moreover, some or all of such measures may substitute for other forms of 
workplace representation and in particular the work council. 
Studies of the determinants of works council presence (and formation/dissolution) are 
altogether more numerous than for collective bargaining status (see, for example, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Massa-Wirth (2005). On the effects of pacts, see Hübler (2005a, 2005b, 2006); Bellmann, Gerlach, and Meyer 
(2008); Bellmann and Gerner (2009). 
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references contained in Jirjahn, 2009), not least since they also form part of the burgeoning 
literature of the effects of works councils on firm performance (reviewed extensively in 
Addison, 2009). Perhaps the main relation in the present context is that the entity is more 
likely to be observed in situations where the firm is covered by a collective agreement, 
irrespective of the form of the agreement with the growth of decentralized bargaining 
tendencies noted earlier. That is to say, works councils are not only responsible for the local 
administration of collective agreements but also have become more involved in their 
negotiation in recent years. To this largely descriptive association, we can of course add the 
aforementioned predictions stemming from heightened uncertainty and directly proxied by, 
say, profit-sharing schemes and inversely proxied by expected improvements in sales. A 
recent paper by Mohrenweiser, Marginson, and Backes-Gellner (2009) takes the issue further 
than can we. This is because the authors have information from a unique data set on the 
extent to which the two sides – the workforce and plant management – are involved in the 
setting up of a works council. They report that although the former alone calls for the election 
of a works council in around two-thirds of the 60 companies that set up a works council 
between 2001 and 2005, in the remaining one-third of cases management was actively 
involved in the process (e.g. by motivating workers to call for an election). Consistent with 
Jirjahn (2009), they report that the establishment of a works council is basically triggered by 
uncertainty on the part of the workforce as to the security of employment caused by 
organizational shocks and reflecting informational problems/asymmetries that can be tackled 
by the information and consultation rights of the works council. The motive is defensive: risk 
protection (or what Jirjahn terms ‘rent protection’). Where management is the triggering 
agent, it is argued that expected productivity improvement dominates potential rent 
distribution. At issue of course is whether the authors’ methodology establishes the primacy 
of rent protection over rent creation and the unexplored issue of works council dissolution. 
Finally, we note that any study of changes in the structure of German collective 
bargaining and worker representation should, for the reasons given earlier, control for 
industry affiliation. Similarly, it should also control for region, given the different trends in 
eastern and western Germany (namely, the more pronounced erosion of sectoral bargaining in 
the former region).  
Turning to Great Britain, the fragmented nature of the British industrial relations 
system means that the focus of empirical investigation has been workplace-level employment 
relations, facilitated by the publication of the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys 
where the unit of analysis is the workplace. The standard measure used to identify formal 
union bargaining rights has been union recognition, rather than collective bargaining 
coverage. Union recognition indicates whether a union is “recognized by management for 
negotiating pay and conditions for any sections of the workforce in the establishment” – at 
workplace, organizational, or sectoral level. Although the two measures are conceptually very 
similar and highly correlated in practice, there has been some divergence in recent years and 
a growing proportion of workplaces with union recognition appear to have no active 
collective bargaining.  For many observers, this gap in the two measures, which we will 
return to below, is at least partly explained by the increasing inability of unions to get the 
employer to bargain over terms and conditions, even when a framework for such negotiation 
is in place (Brown et al., 1998).  In the absence of clear legal rules governing the enforcement 
of bargaining rights in Britain, unions have tended to rely on their bargaining power, 
traditionally proxied by the proportion of workers who are union members at the workplace 
(i.e. union density).  The latter magnitude continues to decline in the private sector, even if 
the pace of decline is not as rapid as it was in the 1980s and early 1990s. Measures of union 
strength used in the past –  such as separate bargaining arrangements in the face of multi-
unionism – have become so uncommon that they today are no longer the focus of attention, 
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while others (such as closed shop arrangements) are no longer permitted under British law. 
Nevertheless, it would be quite misleading to assume that all unions are weak in British 
workplaces. Indeed, Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000: chapter 5) show a bifurcation in 
union strength using measures of density, on-site lay representation, and collective bargaining 
coverage. Unions continue to influence outcomes such as wage setting, but only where the 
workplace has a high percentage of employees whose pay is set by collective bargaining 
(Millward and Forth, 2004). 
Although there are potentially important theoretical implications for firm performance 
having to do with the level at which bargaining occurs, their effects have rarely been tested in 
Britain of late due to the rapid decline of sectoral bargaining.9 The empirical literature on the 
determinants of different bargaining levels is also very sparse.  Rather, the focus has been 
upon whether a workplace is unionized or not and, if so, how strong the union is at workplace 
level. 
The analysis of Schnabel, Zagelmayer, and Kohaut (2006), mentioned earlier, 
provides the only study of the correlates of collective bargaining arrangements in Britain and 
Germany, using workplace-level data.  Based on empirical analyses of the 1998 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey and the 2000 IAB Establishment Panel, the authors argue that 
the correlates of bargaining arrangements are similar for both countries. They point to the 
significant role played by factors such as establishment size, single versus multi-plant 
organizations, foreign ownership, and establishment age. However, their analysis differs in a 
number of important respects from our own. First, their study covers the whole economy 
(public and private sectors together) whereas we focus on the private sector. Second, they 
provide ordered probit estimates on a 2000 cross-section for three states: absence of 
bargaining, single-employer bargaining, and multi-employer or sectoral bargaining.  In 
contrast, we focus on probit and multinomial logistic estimates for the presence or otherwise 
of particular bargaining regimes and switching across regimes using panel data.  Third, our 
model specifications differ in a number of respects from theirs. For example, we incorporate 
lagged regime status in our panel models, JCC status, and variables capturing market 
competition. Finally, these authors’ models are unweighted whereas we use survey-weighted 
data. 
The most recent cet. par. investigation of the correlates of union recognition in the 
private sector is by Blanchflower and Bryson (2009).  In addition to sizeable differences in 
the probability of unionization by region and industry, factors independently correlated with 
higher union recognition probabilities in this study are firm and establishment size, domestic 
ownership, establishment age, and some features of workforce composition such as the 
manual/non-manual split (although this effect has diminished over time). Pooled analyses for 
the period 1980-2004 also show a strong independent time trend, with the probability of 
union recognition declining since the early 1980s. Others have shown that this cohort effect 
may date back to the early post-war period (Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2009: 55-56) go on 
to calculate that two-thirds of the decline in private sector union recognition is within-group 
and thus is more akin to a preference on the part of employers (conditional on their 
observable characteristics) rather than being accounted for by compositional change in the 
population of British workplaces. 
Brown, Bryson, and Forth (2009: 26-31) undertake a similar analysis, but this time 
focusing on the incidence of (any workers being covered by) collective bargaining at the 
workplace. But their results are similar: the probability of collective bargaining is higher 
among larger and older establishments and in multi-plant and larger firms. They uncover 
                                                 
9 For discussion of these theoretical effects, particularly the effects of industry-level bargaining, see Bryson and 
Wilkinson (2002: Chapter 2, endnote 6). And for a rare empirical study exploring the effect of industry-level 
bargaining on firm performance in Britain, see Menezes-Filho (1997). 
13 
 
similar time trends as well. They also present clear evidence of workforce composition 
effects, collective bargaining coverage being less likely in workplaces with a higher share of 
female workers and a greater proportion of non-manual workers. However, the main thrust of 
their analysis relates to the pervasive influence of product market competition. They show 
that increasing product market competition has played a critical role in undermining 
collective bargaining arrangements, with employers increasingly resorting to unilateral pay 
setting at the organization or workplace level. 
 
 
V.  Data 
 
The German data used in this inquiry are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel. The Panel 
is based on a stratified random sample of the plants10 – the strata are currently defined over 
17 industries and 10 employment size categories – from the population of all establishments 
with at least one employee covered by social insurance (see Fischer et al., 2009). The basis 
for sampling is the Federal Employment Agency establishment file, containing some 2 
million establishments. The panel was set up in 1993 for western Germany so as to provide a 
representative information system permitting continuous analysis of labor demand. It was 
applied to eastern Germany in 1996 and is therefore now nationwide in its coverage. From 
the outset the IAB Establishment panel was intended as a longitudinal survey, so that a large 
majority of the same plants are interviewed each year. To correct for panel mortality, exits, 
and newly founded firms, however, the data are augmented regularly. Taken in conjunction 
with other extension samples (to allow regional analysis at the federal state level), the panel 
has grown over time and now the number of plants surveyed is around 16,000 units. 
The panel questionnaire consists of a set of questions that are asked in identical form 
each year. Such questions cover employment development, business policy, vocational 
training, personnel structure/movements, investment, wages and salaries, and adherence to 
collective agreements. Since 2007 these basic subject ‘blocs’ have been augmented by 
questions on further training, innovation, and working time. And at regular three-year (now 
two-year) intervals, the basic indicators are regularly supplemented by additional questions 
on such things as public funding. In addition to these fixed and quasi-fixed elements, other 
varying ‘current focus’ subjects are included every year. These have included questions on 
the demand for qualified employees and the employment of older workers and the 
cooperativeness or otherwise of the works council. Finally, the survey is conducted in mid 
year and as a result some questions – on annual sales, investment, and the profit situations – 
are asked retrospectively in the following year’s survey. 
In the present study we restrict the German data to the period from 1998 to 2004 to 
maintain correspondence with the British WERS98. Over this entire period the German raw 
sample contains a total of some 95,375 observations. The following filters were applied to 
provide a sample of seven cross sections that are comparable to the final estimation samples. 
The filters were as follows (with the number of observations lost in applying each being 
given in parenthesis): selection of industries (15,560); selection of plants employing at least 5 
employees (13,688), excision of public corporations (1,133); excision of plants where 
information on sales is not provided (6,967); and excision of plants where information on 
either collective agreement status or works council status is missing (4,892). Most of our 
descriptive results for Germany, therefore, are based on a total number of 53,135 
observations, or approximately 7,600 observations a year on average.11 
                                                 
10 Large plants are oversampled but the sampling within each cell is random. 
11 A detailed overview of the sample sizes and the filters applied are available from the authors upon request. 
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In a second step, this sample is reduced to establishments that are observed in 1998 
and 2004 (but not necessarily in any or all intermediate years) to provide a final estimation 
sample similar to the WERS98. This estimation sample will be referred to as the incomplete 
panel case, and contains 1,747 establishments or 3,494 observations. We will also deploy a 
smaller sample made up of 1,060 establishments comprising those plants for which we have 
information in every single year of the sample period 1998 to 2004. This will be referred to as 
the complete panel case. 
Prior to presenting the descriptive statistics, some additional comments on the data set 
should be noted. First, we also used the 1993 and 2005 waves to check responses to the 
collective bargaining (and works council) status questions. Given inertia, plants that 
responded to the status question(s) as either yes-no-yes or no-yes-no in the three years 
1997/99 and 2003/05 were treated as yes-yes-yes and no-no-no, respectively, involving some 
recoding of the beginning and end-of-period responses. Second, changes in industrial 
classification in 1999 do not cause any problems for us because of the design of the present 
study. Thus, for the descriptive analyses, the cross sections are reduced to the same set of 
industries using the corresponding classification provided each year, whereas our estimations 
are in most cases based on data for 1998 and hence are unaffected by changes in industrial 
classification. Moreover, our estimations are based on the plants being observed in both 1998 
and 2004, so that the classification for 1998 can be used, assuming establishments do not 
change industry. Third, we use weighted data throughout. The inverse of the selection 
probability is used for cross-section weighting. Due to the nature of the weighting process, it 
is generally the case that an establishment is allocated different weighting factors in any two 
subsequent waves.12 Definition of the variables used and descriptive statistics are provided in 
Appendix Table 1. 
Our British analysis deploys three data sets. These are the Workplace Employment 
Relations Surveys (WERS) of 1998 and 2004, which are cross-sectional surveys of 
workplaces and their employees, and the 1998-2004 Panel.  The latter is based on a stratified 
random subsample of the 1998 WERS cross-section that was followed up in 2004. That 
follow-up consisted of a dedicated panel survey which was considerably shorter than the 
1998 survey interview.  This asymmetry in data collection means that pooled analyses of the 
1998 and 2004 Panel data draw on a more restricted set of data items than those analyses 
which seek to predict 2004 outcomes with 1998 covariates. 
Our empirical analysis is confined to private sector workplaces with 10 or more 
employees, since this was the lower employment threshold for inclusion in the 1998 survey.  
The unweighted sample is 587 workplaces, though some cases are dropped in the analysis 
because they have missing information on one or more key data items. Throughout our 
analyses are weighted with survey sampling weights that account for the probability of 
sample selection (which in WERS is a function of establishment size and industry).  The 
population sampling frame from which the surveys are drawn is the Inter-Departmental 
Business Register (IDBR).13 
Unlike the IAB Establishment Data, in the British case we only observe workplaces at 
two points in time, namely, 1998 and 2004. Thus the data offer ‘snapshots’ of those 
workplaces at two points in time, although there is a small amount of retrospective 
questioning about what has happened in the intervening years. Our data structure allows us to 
identify three types of workplace. First, there are those that survived throughout the period 
1998-2004 and had at least 10 employees at the beginning and the end of the period, since 
                                                 
12 Either because the target structure (the number of establishments or employees in the target structure of the 
respective weighting cell) changes, or because the number of surveyed establishments in the weighting cell 
changes, and/or because an establishment changes, size, industry or federal state between two waves. 
13 For full information on the surveys, see Kersley et al. (2006); Cully et al. (1999); and Chaplin et al. (2005). 
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this is the sampling threshold for inclusion in the 1998 survey. We call these units ‘stayers.’ 
All the Panel workplaces are, by definition, stayers but we can also use information on age of 
establishment and establishment size to identify stayers in both cross-sections. Second, we 
can identify ‘joiners,’ that is, those new workplaces born since 1998 together with those that 
grew above the 10 employee threshold since 1998. The third group is ‘leavers,’ consisting of 
workplaces that were present in 1998 but had either died by 2004 or else had shrunk below 
the 10 employee threshold. We use these data in combination to establish the role played by 
behavioral change among stayers on the one hand and compositional change arising from the 
differential incidence of bargaining practices among leavers and joiners on the other. In order 
to accomplish this we must rely on definitions of union recognition, collective bargaining and 
joint consultative committees (JCCs) that are consistently measured in both the two cross-
sections and the Panel. This is relatively unproblematic in the case of union recognition and 
JCCs.  However, WERS collects bargaining coverage data in a number of ways. We use 
measures available for the two cross-sections and the Panel. The collective bargaining 
measure identifies whether a workplace determines pay for any of its occupational groups 
using collective bargaining, either through multiemployer, organization-level, or workplace-
level bargaining. The manager responsible for human resources is asked to identify which of 
eight methods are used to determine pay for the single-digit occupations at the workplace. 
The first three codes relate to sectoral, organizational and workplace-level bargaining, 
respectively. The reasons for relying on this measure are two-fold.  First, it is the only 
consistent measure of collective bargaining across the two cross-sections and the Panel.  
Second, it is the only measure which permits us to distinguish between coverage at 
workplace, organization, and sectoral level. However, the downside is that it understates the 
level of collective bargaining relative to measures that also incorporate other WERS data 
items.14 Definition of the variables used and descriptive statistics for the British case are 
provided in Appendix Table 2. 
 
 
VI.  Findings 
 
(a) Germany 
Weighted data on the evolution of collective bargaining and worker representation – sectoral 
agreements, firm agreements, no agreements, and works councils – are provided in Appendix 
Table 3.  Figures 1 and 2 present the material in a more digestible form for establishment and 
worker coverage, respectively. Beginning with collective agreements, it is clear from Figure 
1 that employer coverage by sectoral agreements declined materially over the sample period: 
from 48.9 percent to 40.4 percent coverage. On the other hand, the coverage of firm 
agreements among employers was more stable, declining from 4.8 percent in 1998 to 2.8 
percent in 2004, with most of that decline occurring after the first year. Corresponding to the 
decline in sectoral bargaining was a marked increase in the number of firms without any 
collective agreements. These rose from 46.2 percent in 1998 to 56.8 percent in 2004. For 
their part, the share of firms with works councils showed considerable inertia, generally 
exceeding 9 percent over the sample period. 
Figure 2 looks at corresponding changes in the shares of covered and uncovered 
employees. Beginning again with sectoral bargaining, the recorded fall in the share of 
covered workers was from 62 percent to 53.8 percent, somewhat less than in the case of 
establishment coverage. Imperceptible falls were recorded for firm agreements (8.6 percent to 
8.0 percent). Correspondingly, the number of workers uncovered by either type of collective 
                                                 
14 For a full discussion of this issue see Kersley et al. (2006), pp. 181-188 and footnotes 1 and 3 in Chapter 7. 
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agreement duly rose from 29.3 to 38.2 percent. Again, works councils coverage displayed 
considerable stability, although a small overall decline from 45.3 to 43.7 percent was 
observed. 
Two further points are in order. First, as regards the collective bargaining-works 
council nexus, declines in sectoral agreement coverage among establishments with works 
councils were no less pronounced than among establishments without works councils. For 
example, sectoral agreement coverage of employees was 77.3 percent in 1998 in works 
council establishments and 49.4 percent in their works council free counterparts; by 2004 
these figures had fallen to 69.2 and 41.9 percent, respectively. Similar declines were observed 
in the sectoral agreement coverage of establishments in the two regimes. Accordingly, there 
is nothing really to suggest that coverage in either case held up better in the presence of 
workplace representation.  
Second, there are those German plants that although they do not have collective 
bargaining nonetheless orient themselves towards a collective agreement (The following 
question is asked of those not bound by a collective agreement: “Are you [nonetheless] acting 
upon an industry-wide agreement?”) This raises the possibility that a decline in collective 
bargaining might have been counteracted by an increase in the number of firms orienting 
themselves towards such framework agreements. As a practical matter, we discover that the 
share of all employers (employees in establishments) that did not orient themselves towards a 
collective agreement rose between 1999 (the first year for which data were available) and 
2004 from 25.4 (15.2) to 29.2 (18.7) percent. Over the same interval, the share of all 
employees (establishments) that did orient rose more slowly from 21.9 (15.5) percent to 25.1 
(17.8) percent. In other words, there was some relative fall in orientation among the steadily 
increasing numbers of plants and employees not covered by collectively bargaining (see 
Appendix Table 4)  
The next question that arises is whether the decline in collective bargaining is 
observed throughout or is instead a compositional phenomenon, with different behavior being 
recorded by stayers, joiners, and leavers. To examine this question we first examine changes 
in the status of those establishments that remained in the panel throughout, the ‘stayers.’ 
Figure 3 presents weighted data for these stayers, based on the information supplied in 
Appendix Table 5. As can be seen, the broad trends evident in Figure 1 are replicated in 
Figure 3. Beginning with sectoral agreements, establishment coverage rates declined from 
55.2 percent to 47.1 percent, while establishments without collective agreements grew from 
40.4 percent to 47.7 percent of the total. There were even modest increases in the share of 
establishments with works councils (from 9.8 percent to 13.2 percent) and with firm-level 
collective agreements (from 4.5 percent in 1998 to 5.2 percent on 2004, albeit with several 
reversals). Figure 4 which describes the situation from the perspective of employment shares 
reveals a more muted picture of sectoral bargaining decline and uncovered sector growth, but 
more marked works council growth. 
At the same time, based on the data supplied in Appendix Table 6, it can be seen that, 
among entrants to the panel, which may be recently-founded establishments or plants 
sampled for the first time, establishment (employment) coverage by sectoral agreement fell 
from 50.4 (61.9) percent in 1998 to 31.6 (53.4) percent while the share of uncovered plants 
(employment) rose from 45.5 (29.3) percent to 64.9 (38.6) percent. Among ‘exits,’ 
comprising plants that had closed and nonrespondents, the corresponding values were (from 
1999; see Notes to Appendix Table 7) 50.7 (56.5) to 38.2 (51.0) percent and 46.1 (31.5) to 
59.8 (40.0) percent. In short, while the basic trends in respect of sectoral agreements and the 
zero collective bargaining zone point to a general decline in the importance of framework 
agreements the tendencies are much stronger among entrants and exits than stayers. Finally, 
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as far as works councils are concerned inertia is the order of the day with little to choose 
between stayers, leavers, and entrants.     
 Let us next consider transitions into and out of collective bargaining and workplace 
representation as between 1998 and 2004. Table 1 summarizes such movements with separate 
results for the complete and incomplete panels. It will be recalled that for the former or 
balanced panel one has information on each and every year of the eight years whereas in the 
case of the latter panel information on one or more of the intermediate years is missing. 
Beginning with works councils, we observe that just 3.7 percent of all firms changed their 
works council affiliation among the incomplete panel. (These comprised the 1.83 percent of 
firms that had no councils in 1998 and 23.04 percent of the much smaller number of firms 
with councils in 1998.) Similar magnitudes are reported for the balanced panel. 
Somewhat less evidence of persistence is reported in the case of collective agreements 
of any type. Now almost 20 percent of firms in the incomplete panel and slightly less than 
that in the balanced panel changed their collective bargaining status. This reflects changes in 
industry-level agreements shown in the next two columns of the table. In the case of the 
incomplete panel a little over 20 percent changed their sectoral agreement status (made up of 
the more than one in ten firms without collective agreements in 1998 that had entered 
framework agreements by 2004 and the more than one-quarter that had left such 
arrangements). Although the latter percentage was much the same as observed for works 
councils, note the very much larger sample of firms in both categories. Again there are minor 
differences between the balanced and incomplete panels.  
Transitions into and out of firm level collective agreements tell a very different story. 
Overall, there were fewer transitions than in the case of works councils. Less than 4 percent 
of firms introduced or exited such arrangements, but of those firms with firm-level 
agreements in 1998 more than one-half had abandoned them by 2004. Not surprisingly in 
view of the numbers the huge majority of firms did not change their status. Again, more firms 
exited collective agreements than entered them. 
The results of trying to explain collective bargaining of any type using pooled data for 
the two years 1998 and 2004 are given in the first column of Table 2, again using weighted 
data. Our probit estimates suggest that larger and older plants, plants with works councils, 
plants that have recently delegated decision making authority, and plants located in Western 
Germany are all more likely to have collective agreements. Conversely, establishments 
having a greater export share and a higher proportion of workers on fixed-term contracts are 
less likely to be covered by collective bargaining.15  
The second and third columns of the table disaggregate by sectoral and firm-level 
collective bargaining, respectively. With one exception – the foreign property variable – the 
findings reported for sectoral bargaining mirror those presented for any collective bargaining, 
although there are of course differences in the precision of the estimates. But only the works 
council result carries over in the case of firm-level collective bargaining shown in the last 
column of the table. Note the oppositely signed coefficient estimate for export share, foreign 
ownership, and region observed in the case of firm-level collective agreements. Evidently, 
the determinants of sectoral and firm-level collective bargaining differ materially.  
Attention shifts in our second set of regressions, contained in Table 3, to the 
prediction of end-period collective bargaining status based on beginning-period values of the 
covariates. All regressions include a lagged dependent variable to capture the persistence 
indicated in our transitions analysis, and partly for this reason the good fit obtained is not 
unexpected. The results for collective bargaining of all types, reported in the first column, of 
                                                 
15 Rather fewer coefficient estimates were well defined than when using unweighted data, including the 
establishment size argument. Weighted data are used in the interests of facilitating comparisons between Britain 
and Germany. 
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the table show that there are five statistically significant positive coefficient estimates in 
addition to the lagged dependent variable. Thus, greater establishment size, usage of 
advanced technology, delegation of authority to lower levels in the organization, a larger 
share of female workers and location in western Germany are all associated with an increased 
likelihood of observing a collective agreement in 2004.  On the other hand, introduction of 
profit centers and the share of part-time workers detract (marginally) from collective 
bargaining.  
As before, the findings for the two types of collective bargaining are sharply 
differentiated. From the second column of the table it can be seen that, apart from the 
persistence argument, establishment size, high-tech usage, single establishments, the 
proportions of skilled and female workers, and west German location are all associated with 
observing sectoral bargaining in 2004. For their part, the R&D and part-time worker variables 
are negatively correlated with sectoral bargaining. Finally, for firm-level agreements, the 
results given in the last column of the table suggest that expected increases in sales, advanced 
technology, single plant status, and location in western Germany are all less likely to promote 
such agreements. But export orientation, R&D activity, delegation of authority, works 
council presence, and greater competition are now associated with an increased probability of 
observing such agreements.  
This leads us to the most interesting material of all dealing with the explanation of 
transitions. The results given in the first column of Table 4 consider collective bargaining 
status of any type in 2004 conditional on an absence of collective bargaining in 1998. We see 
that ‘joining’ is more likely the larger is the plant, the more advanced its technology, the 
higher the skills of its workforce (and the share of female workers), and also where the 
establishment is foreign owned, a single plant, has delegated decision-making authority, and 
is located in Western Germany. It is less likely when sales are expected to increase, when 
competition is acute, and where the plant was set up before 1990. The second column of the 
table considers the likelihood of leaving a collective agreement of any type. As can be seen, 
while the large majority of the coefficient estimates are indeed negative just three – increased 
sales, advanced technology, and location in western Germany – are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The share of part-time workers is the sole statistically significant positive 
coefficient. Clearly, the specific characteristics identified in this equation other than the 
industry dummies are providing few insights into the special circumstances of leavers. 
The findings in the third column of Table 4 pertain to the determinants of sectoral 
bargaining status in 2004 conditional on there being no such agreement in place in 1998. 
Joining a sectoral collective agreement is more likely for larger establishments, high-tech 
firms, single plants, firms with greater shares of female and fixed-term contract workers, 
foreign-owned enterprises, among those located in western Germany, and in situations where 
some delegation of decision making has been initiated. Joining a sectoral agreement is less 
likely among the firmament of older firms and those with greater export orientation, and also 
in circumstances where sales are expected to increase. As before, we gain few insights into 
the process of leaving sectoral agreements from this set of correlates. 
The last two columns of the table consider joining and leaving firm-level collective 
agreements. Joiners are more likely to be those plants with a higher export share, having a 
works council, confronting greater product market competition, and engaging in a delegation 
of tasks. On the other hand, joining is less likely where sales are expected to increase, among 
high-tech and single-establishment firms, and where the plant is located in western Germany. 
And from the last column of the table, abandoning firm-level bargaining is more likely when 
sales are expected to increase, and where there is a higher proportion of fixed-term contract 
and female workers. Further, leaving is also more common among both high-tech and older 
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firms. It is less likely for larger firms, for firms practicing R&D, and for those with a higher 
share of part-time workers, practicing profit sharing, and confronting greater competition. 
Finally, Table 5 focuses on changes in works council status, namely, on works council 
joiners and leavers. First, consider the class of joiners. It can be seen that larger and foreign-
owned plants, plus those with advanced technology, registering R&D activity, and having 
higher shares of female workers are all more likely to introduce works councils, as indeed are 
those with firm-level agreements. But note that establishments that have introduced team-
work, those expecting increased sales, and those individually owned are all less likely to set 
up works councils. These results provide very mixed support for the literature.  
And what of the leavers? We find that plants covered by sectoral collective bargaining 
evince a lower tendency to abandon works councils as do larger firms, firms expecting 
increased sales, older firms, foreign-owned firms, as well as firms registering R&D activity, a 
higher proportion of skilled workers, foreign owned and confronting higher competition in 
the market. But high-tech establishments, single plants, individually-owned plants, and those 
with devolved decision-making, recently introduced profit centers, and a higher proportion of 
fixed-term contract workers are all associated with a higher probability of abandoning works 
councils which evidence is perhaps more consistent with past research (e.g. Addison, 
Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2003).  
 
(b) Great Britain 
Table 6 compares the incidence of our five measures of worker representation and collective 
bargaining in the 1998 and 2004 WERS cross-sections. A number of things are immediately 
apparent. First, unionization – whether measured in terms of union recognition or the 
incidence of collective bargaining – is considerably lower in Britain than in Germany 
throughout the period. Even at the beginning of the period, only one-in-five private sector 
workplaces recognized unions for pay bargaining. Second, in contrast to Germany, where pay 
bargaining does occur, it is more likely to occur at firm-level than at sectoral level: it was 
twice as likely to do so in 1998, and three-and-a-half times more likely to do so at the end of 
the period.  (Although, as noted earlier, employers are free to combine sectoral and firm-level 
bargaining, fewer than 1 percent of workplaces do so.) Third, as in Germany, the chief 
indicators of collective bargaining are in decline. The percentage of workplaces with a 
recognized union fell by one-quarter over the period, while collective bargaining coverage 
fell by over one-third so that, at the end of the period, only one-in-ten private sector 
workplaces used collective bargaining to set pay for at least some of their employees. This 
decline was particularly evident in workplaces with sectoral agreements. Fourth, the 
incidence of collective bargaining coverage is well below the incidence of union recognition 
throughout the period, a finding consistent with earlier studies showing an absence of active 
collective bargaining among many establishments even when they have a formal negotiating 
framework in place. 
In the last column of Table 6 we turn to the incidence of JCCs, the closest analog to 
works councils in Germany. As noted earlier, our JCC definition is confined to committees 
which tackle multiple issues. We present figures for two definitions of JCC presence. The 
first definition includes JCCs at both workplace level and those at the level of an organization 
in multi-site firms.  Over a third of private sector establishments had such a JCC in 1998, but 
their incidence fell by one-fifth over the sample period. The figures in parentheses are 
confined to workplace-level JCCs. Around 15 percent of private sector workplaces had a JCC 
in 1998, but this figure fell by one-third by 2004 to just below 10 percent – a figure which is 
similar to the incidence of Betriebsräte in the German data. 
Table 7 presents similar data but this time using employee weights to obtain the 
employee coverage of these institutions. In all cases the percentages are substantially higher 
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than in Table 6 because these institutions of worker representation and collective bargaining 
are concentrated in the larger workplaces that account for a higher share of all employees.  
For example, in 1998 one-fifth of workplaces recognised a union for pay bargaining but these 
accounted for almost two-fifths of employees. Similarly, almost half of all employees work in 
a firm with a JCC, though closer to a third have one at their own workplace.   
The collective bargaining figures are constructed in a slightly different fashion to 
those presented in Table 6. Rather than simply reweighting the workplace incidence of 
collective bargaining by the proportion of employees in those workplaces, the figures shown 
in Table 7 ensure that uncovered employees in workplaces with a collective agreement are 
not counted among the covered employees.16 That is they represent the actual coverage of 
collective bargaining We see that this magnitude falls from around one-quarter to one-fifth 
over the period, with the vast majority of those workers covered by firm-level agreements. 
However, the percentage covered by firm level agreements has fallen quite dramatically. 
Table 8 considers change in workplace representation and bargaining structures 
among ‘stayers,’ ‘leavers’ and ‘joiners,’ respectively, offering insights as to how much of the 
net change described above is driven by behavioral change among stayers, and how much of 
it arises from compositional change in workplaces as some of them shrink or die (‘leavers’) 
while others grow or are new-born (‘joiners’). In each case, we show the incidence of 
arrangements in 1998 and 2004 and the percentage point difference over the period. 
Beginning with union recognition, its decline over the period appears to be driven by 
compositional change: the rate of union recognition was two-and-a-half times greater among 
leavers in 1998 than it was among the joiners in 2004 (19 percent versus 8 percent). In 
contrast, there was relative stability in the rate of union recognition among stayers, although 
it is notable that the recognition rate in the panel rises a little whereas it falls a little among 
the stayers in the cross-section. A very similar picture emerges regarding change in the 
incidence of collective bargaining. Compared with joiners, leavers are roughly twice as likely 
to have pay set by collective bargaining.  Among stayers, change is less pronounced.  
The situation is more mixed in the case of JCCs. There is little difference in the use of 
JCCs among joiners and leavers, whereas there has been a substantial decline in their use 
among stayers in the cross-sectional data. However, the picture of decline is not replicated in 
the panel. If we turn our attention to workplace-level JCCs, clearer indications of decline 
emerge when comparing joiners and leavers (and among stayers), in the cross-sectional data. 
Once again, however, there is greater stability in the Panel. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that compositional change in the population of workplaces is playing a greater role 
than behavioral change among stayers in the decline of collective bargaining and in those 
institutions which represent workers.  Nevertheless, in quantifying the overall effects of these 
changes induced by the behavior of stayers, joiners, and leavers, one needs to bear in mind 
that stayers constitute around two-thirds of all workplaces in the cross-sectional data so that 
their contribution to change is correspondingly large.17 
Table 9 focuses on regime switching among panel workplaces by focusing on their 
union, collective bargaining, and JCC status at the time of the surveys in 1998 and 2004. The 
amount of net change shown gives only a partial understanding of behavioral change among 
these workplaces because it fails to capture the degree to which workplaces either introduce 
or abolish mechanisms for worker representation and collective bargaining.  Union 
                                                 
16 However, there is evidence of a spillover effect of collective bargaining on the wages of uncovered employees 
in the same workplace (Millward and Forth, 2004). 
17 In the 1998 cross-section, 69 percent of private sector workplaces were ‘stayers.’ The remainder were 
‘leavers,’ consisting of workplaces that closed down (19 percent) and workplaces that shrank below the 10 
employee threshold (12 percent). In the 2004 cross-section, 69 percent were stayers while 31 percent were 
joiners. 
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recognition is the most stable of the measures: only 6.5 percent of panel workplaces switch 
union status with new recognitions being a little more common than union de-recognitions. 
This finding is corroborated by retrospective questions asked in the 2004 panel survey 
indicating that 2.8 percent of workplaces claimed to have recognized unions since 1998, 
whereas fewer than 1 percent said they had derecognised a union.18 
Collective bargaining status is much less stable than union recognition status: around 
one-fifth of panel workplaces switch in or out of collective bargaining. This may reflect the 
fact that respondents only identify collective bargaining coverage when there is active 
collective bargaining going on, whereas union recognition indicates the framework within 
which negotiation may take place. Alternatively, there could be more measurement error in 
collective bargaining status if employer respondents find it a more difficult concept to 
comprehend. The amount of switching that occurs corresponds roughly with that in the 
German panel, perhaps lending credence to the idea that the figures are not driven by 
measurement error. However, in the German case, abolitions far outway introductions of 
collective bargaining, largely due to movement out of sectoral agreements. In the British 
case, movements into sectoral collective bargaining marginally outweigh exits but the key 
difference resides in the levels of bargaining incidence. Compared with Germany, coverage 
by sectoral bargaining agreements is uncommon in Britain’s panel workplaces. 
The least stable of our measures is JCC status: one-third of panel workplaces 
belonged to a firm that had either introduced or abolished a JCC over the course of our study.  
However, this percentage falls to one-fifth in the case of workplace-level JCCs, a rate of 
switching which is similar to that for ‘any collective bargaining’ coverage. These figures are 
markedly different from those presented for German works councils in two respects. First, 
JCCs are much more common than works councils. Second, switchers outnumber those who 
retain workplace JCCs by a ratio to 3:2. In Germany by contrast, works council switchers are 
outnumbered by those who retain a council throughout, perhaps reflecting the greater 
transaction costs involved in changing arrangements when they are underpinned by statute. 
We now turn to the determinants of collective bargaining and workplace 
representation. We begin in Table 10 with parsimonious probit estimation of the correlates of 
union recognition and collective bargaining status in models that pool the workplace 
observations in 1998 and 2004. The outcomes of interest are union recognition, any collective 
bargaining, sectoral bargaining, and firm-level bargaining. The models perform reasonably 
well, accounting for between one-fifth and one-third of the variance in the unionization 
outcomes, although few effects are significant across all four measures. Union recognition 
and collective bargaining are more likely in larger establishments, the latter association being 
driven by an association with firm-level collective bargaining. Domestic ownership is also 
positively associated with collective bargaining.  Product markets also matter: those operating 
in a local market (as opposed to a regional, national or international market) are significantly 
more likely to have recognized unions and collective bargaining, as one might expect if local 
markets are an indicator of lower competitive pressures. Although the gender composition of 
                                                 
18 These figures do not match the estimates of switching behavior taken from the establishment’s status at the 
two survey cross-section time points. This may arise for three reasons. First, the retrospective questions may 
have captured new recognitions and derecognitions of unions in multiple union settings, whereupon such 
changes may not necessarily have affected their status as having at least one recognised union or not. For 
example, a workplace with three recognized unions in 1998 may report a derecognition in response to the 
retrospective question covering the period 1998-2004.  However, it may still have two recognized unions 
remaining, in which case they will still be classified as unionized in 2004. Second, the retrospective questions 
may capture switches in the intervening period between 1998 and 2004 which, if reversed subsequently, will not 
be captured in comparisons of union status at the beginning and the end of the period. Third, responses to 
retrospective questions may be subject to more measurement error than responses about status at a single point 
in time. 
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the workforce is not associated with unionization and collective bargaining, the presence of 
temporary employees and those on fixed-term contracts is positively associated with sectoral 
bargaining. The presence of a joint consultative committee (either at workplace or 
organization level) is positively associated with union recognition and collective bargaining, 
a finding that perhaps reflects complementarity as opposed to substitutability, and is 
reminiscent of the link between works councils and collective bargaining in Germany. Team 
working and the use of contingent pay schemes are negatively associated with collective 
bargaining, the former association being driven by firm-level bargaining and the latter 
association by a sectoral bargaining connection. The year dummy indicates an absence of 
significant time trends.   
Next in Table 11 we model unionization and collective bargaining status in 2004 as a 
function of covariates measured in the base period, 1998.  These models differ a little from 
the previous specifications in Table 10 reflecting the greater range of covariates available in 
the 1998 cross-section.19 There is strong persistence in recognition and collective bargaining 
status, as indicated by positive, significant coefficients on the lagged dependent variables. 
This is particularly so in the case of union recognition, which helps explain the high 
percentage of variance accounted for by this model. The exception is sectoral bargaining 
where the lagged dependent variable is not significant, either because it was in a state of flux 
or because these results suffer from measurement error, as one might expect if workplace 
managers are being asked to identify practices occurring above workplace level.  
Being a single-establishment organization in 1998 is not associated with unionization 
in 2004. However, larger establishments in 1998 were more likely to recognize unions and 
more likely to have firm-level collective bargaining in 2004 than smaller establishments. 
Domestic ownership is positively associated with union recognition. Family ownership, on 
the other hand, is negatively associated with all four union measures. Workforce composition 
effects (percent female, percent part-time, and the incidence of fixed-term or temporary 
employees) are generally not significant, apart from the case of sectoral collective bargaining 
where the percent female and the percent part-time coefficients have opposite signs. The 
probability of sectoral bargaining coverage in 2004 rises with the percent female in 1998, 
whereas it lowers the probability of firm-level bargaining. Occupational composition, as 
indicated by the largest non-managerial occupation at the workplace, is statistically 
significant. Craft and skilled manual employees are least likely to work in workplaces 
recognising trade unions by 2004, whereas those in operative and assembly occupations are 
the most likely to be doing so. Active collective bargaining in 2004 is least likely in 
workplaces where the largest occupational group in 1998 was personal service employees. 
Workplaces where professionals made up the largest group in 1998 had the greatest 
likelihood of coverage under sectoral-level bargaining in 2004. The occupational pattern of 
firm-level bargaining is quite different: it is least likely in 2004 in those workplaces where 
the largest occupational group in 1998 was personal services or science/technical employees. 
A positive association with local product markets was only apparent in case of sectoral 
bargaining.  There is a strong negative association between being located in London and 
collective bargaining, both sectoral and firm-level.  The presence of a JCC in 1998 was 
positively associated with union recognition in 2004, but not with collective bargaining 
coverage. Finally, the use of contingent pay in 1998 was negatively associated with union 
recognition and sectoral bargaining in 2004, but not with firm-level bargaining. There are two 
broad points emerging from Table 11 that are worthy of note. First, much of the variance in 
unionization and collective bargaining status can be captured with workplace-level covariates 
                                                 
19 Reflecting the fact that the 2004 follow-up survey was much shorter than the 1998 survey due to budgetary 
constraints. 
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obtained some 6 to 7 years previously. Second, the correlates of these alternative measures of 
union engagement in pay bargaining differ in a number of dimensions. The only statistically 
significant effect that is common to all four models is the negative association with family 
ownership.  
The next logical step in our exploration of factors affecting collective bargaining and 
worker representation is to identify workplace characteristics which predispose workplaces to 
switch bargaining regime, as opposed to sticking with their original arrangements. To 
investigate this we distinguish between four outcomes. The first, which is the default position 
in Britain, is to remain without union representation or collective bargaining coverage 
throughout the period (0 in 1998 and 0 in 2004). The second outcome is being covered in 
1998 but uncovered by the time of the 2004 survey (1 in 1998 and 0 in 2004). The third 
outcome is entering into bargaining coverage over the period (0 in 1998 and 1 in 2004). The 
final outcome is remaining covered throughout the period (1 in 1998 and 1 in 2004). We seek 
to establish which 1998 workplace characteristics are independently associated with these 
four states by running multinomial logits and using the same set of covariates as in Table 11. 
Table 12 presents this analysis for union recognition status. Three-quarters (74 
percent) of panel establishments did not recognize unions in either 1998 or 2004; one-fifth 
(20 percent) recognized unions in both periods; the remaining 6 percent had switched status 
with 2 percent no longer recognizing unions and 4 percent  recognizing them for the first time 
over the period. The probability of recognizing unions throughout the period, or recognizing 
them for the first time, was higher among larger workplaces. Domestically-owned 
workplaces were more likely to stick with union recognition, or become unionized, than 
workplaces that were foreign-owned in 1998.  Family ownership was strongly associated 
with remaining non-union throughout the period, as was being located in London.   
It is a commonly-held belief that 1980 was a turning point in the unionization of 
British workplaces: evidence has consistently indicated that workplaces set up prior to 1980 
have higher union recognition rates than younger workplaces, with some pointing to the early 
post-war period as the ‘golden era’ for unionization (Millward et al., 2000: 101-103).  
However, Blanchflower and Bryson (2009: 51-53) found this had started to change observing 
a decline in the unionization rate among older workplaces. We find more such evidence here, 
since workplaces born before 1980 are more likely to cease to recognize a union and less 
likely to initiate recognition than their younger counterparts.   
Relative to those operating in wider product markets, those with local markets emerge 
as not only more likely to be unionized throughout the period but also more likely to cease to 
recognise unions. The presence of a JCC in 1998 is conducive to remaining unionized 
throughout, whereas the increased use of contingent pay schemes appears to have reduced the 
probability of workplaces becoming unionized. 
As noted earlier, the incidence of collective bargaining was less stable in the panel 
than the presence of recognized unions. Although seven-in-ten (71 percent) workplaces 
remained uncovered by any collective bargaining throughout, only 8 percent were covered in 
both 1998 and 2004.  The remaining one-fifth (21 percent) were ‘switchers,’ with 9 percent 
moving from covered to uncovered status and 11 percent moving back the other way.  Table 
13 adopts the same estimation approach to that adopted for Table 12 to identify workplace 
correlates of these changes. The model explains less of the variance in collective bargaining 
status than it did union recognition (the pseudo-R2 being 0.37 as opposed to 0.45). 
The correlates of changing bargaining coverage status differ in a number of respects 
from the correlates of changing union recognition status. Larger establishments are more 
likely to remain covered throughout, as in the case of union recognition in Table 12 but, in 
contrast to the union recognition model, larger establishments are also more likely to quit the 
covered sector than smaller establishments. Domestic ownership in 1998 is associated with 
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becoming covered by 2004, but not with persistence in coverage.  Family ownership is 
associated with a lower probability of becoming covered by 2004 but it is not associated with 
leaving coverage or with persistent coverage. Workplace age plays no significant role. 
Workforce composition does play a significant role in coverage change: a higher percentage 
of female employees reduces the probability of persistent coverage relative to never being 
covered, whereas a higher percentage of part-time workers does the opposite. Compared with 
workplaces operating in regional, national, and international product markets, those operating 
in local product markets are less likely to be uncovered throughout and have a higher 
probability of switching in and out of collective bargaining. JCCs are associated with 
persistent collective bargaining coverage but also with leaving coverage. Greater use of 
contingent pay schemes and location in London are both associated with a lower likelihood of 
having any contact with collective bargaining over the period. 
Sectoral collective bargaining is relatively uncommon in Britain compared with 
Germany. In the WERS Panel almost nine-tenths (86 percent) of workplaces had not used 
sectoral collective bargaining in either 1998 or 2004. A mere 1 percent used it in both years. 
Eight percent appear to have joined a sectoral agreement by 2004, while 4 percent had 
sectoral bargaining coverage in 1998 but were no longer covered by a sectoral agreement in 
2004. This distribution of responses makes it relatively difficult to estimate changes in 
sectoral collective bargaining status over the period. The model in Table 14 accounts for 44 
percent of the variance in sectoral bargaining status, but much of this is soaked up by industry 
dummy variables, which is why we include them here.   
Compared with the reference category (Education, Health and Other Community 
Services) workplaces in other industries were less likely to be persistently covered by a 
sectoral agreement, with the exception of Construction where continued sectoral coverage 
was most likely. Larger establishments in 1998 had a higher probability of continued sectoral 
coverage compared with smaller establishments. Domestic and family ownership were not 
significant. Four service sector industries – Hotels and Restaurants, Transport and 
Communication, Financial Services and Business Services – all had a higher probability of 
entering into a sectoral agreement than did Education, Health and Other Community 
Services. Workforce composition also played a role: in addition to a number of significant 
occupational effects, the probability of persistent sectoral coverage and the probability of 
joining a sectoral agreement fell in those workplaces with higher percentages of female 
employees in 1998. Links to firm-level human resource practices are also apparent. Use of 
contingent pay was negatively associated with any contact with sectoral agreements over the 
period; having a JCC in 1998 lowered the probability of persistent sectoral bargaining 
coverage relative to no coverage; and a high incidence of team-working in 1998 led to an 
increased likelihood of leaving a sectoral agreement.  Those in local product markets in 1998 
were more likely than those in larger markets to have joined a sectoral agreement. Finally, 
location in London was associated with a lower propensity to resort to sectoral bargaining. 
Four-fifths (81 percent) of workplaces had no firm-level (either workplace-level or 
organization-level) collective bargaining agreement in 1998 and 2004; 4 percent had one in 
both years; and the remaining 14 percent were split evenly between those dropping their firm 
agreement and those who had adopted one. The correlates of firm-level bargaining status, 
shown in Table 15, differ in many ways from those for sectoral-level bargaining. For 
instance, there is no significant association with the use of contingent pay in 1998. 
Nevertheless, there are some points of similarity such as the negative association between 
location in London and bargaining coverage. Once again, establishment size plays a 
prominent role. The probability of retaining a firm-level agreement, and the probability of 
leaving one, both rise with establishment size relative to the probability of having no firm 
agreement throughout. Single-establishment organizations are less likely than multiple-
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establishment organizations to maintain a firm-level agreement throughout, while family 
ownership in 1998 reduces the probability of adopting a firm-level bargaining agreement by 
2004. Workforce composition also seems to play a role, with occupational composition, part-
time and fixed-term employment all recording statistically significant influences. So, too, 
does the location of the product market, with local product markets being more likely to 
abandon firm-level bargaining than other workplaces with wider markets.  A high incidence 
of team working in 1998 is associated with a lower probability of firm-level bargaining in 
both years, whereas JCC presence is associated with both a higher probability of persistence 
in firm-level agreements and a higher propensity to cease to bargain at firm-level. 
Finally, we consider the correlates of Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) status.  
Table 16 presents results for JCCs at either workplace or firm level, while Table 17 presents 
identical multinomial logit models but restricts the definition of the entity to workplace level 
alone. There is much more switching in JCC status than in bargaining arrangements. For 
JCCs at establishment or firm level, two-fifths (43 percent) had no JCC in either year; one-
quarter (23 percent) had one in both years; 16 percent abolished an existing JCC; and one-
sixth (18 percent) introduced one. The corresponding values for workplace-level JCCs are 74, 
7, 9, and 10 percent, respectively. Given these markedly different distributions it is hardly 
surprising that the workplace correlates of JCC status in the panel differ according to whether 
one uses the ‘any JCC’ variable in Table 16 or the ‘workplace-level JCC’ in Table 17. 
The size and nature of the organization play an important role in determining JCC 
status in Britain. The probability of having a JCC in both years is significantly higher among 
larger establishments and JCCs are less in evidence in single-site firms. The impact of 
establishment size is even greater in the case of workplace JCCs, but the single establishment 
effect disappears. Domestically-owned establishments are less likely to be adopters of JCCs 
than their foreign counterparts, but this effect is not apparent for workplace-level JCCs. 
Family ownership is associated with a lower incidence of JCCs, but the effect is confined to 
the persistence of JCCs when one focuses on workplace-level institutions. 
Whereas the presence of a recognised union in 1998 is associated with a higher 
probability of JCC presence throughout the period, this association is totally absent in the 
case of workplace JCCs. Another big difference is the London effect, which is associated 
with a significantly higher probability of having a workplace JCC throughout the period, 
despite having no significant association with JCCs in general. Finally, those establishments 
operating in a local product market in 1998 had a lower probability than other workplaces of 
switching in and out of workplace-JCC status, a finding that only holds for all JCCs in 
relation to the abolition option. Taken together, it is clear that one needs to be cautious when 
generalizing about the correlates of JCC status since the factors influencing the presence of 
workplace JCCs appear to differ in a number of respects from those factors influencing JCCs 
that exist at either workplace or organization-level. 
 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 
The decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany in the sample period is material but 
less dramatic than might have been expected. After some pronounced decline in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, arguably a degree of normalcy has returned. But only later years will tell 
whether this is sustainable and the outcome of organized deregulation. The decline in 
collective bargaining coverage cannot be due simply to industry dynamics as trends across 
the subgroups examined here are very broadly comparable. Moreover, it has not been offset 
by any opposite shift in ‘orientation.’ That is to say, orientation toward collective agreements 
on the part of uncovered employers has remained fairly constant over the sample period. But 
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this result again qualifies the notion of there having been a continued erosion in the influence 
of collective bargaining.  
Despite substantive institutional inertia, we do observe fairly active switching in and 
out of collective bargaining. Establishment size, branch plant status, skill composition of the 
workforce and, in some specifications, plant age and works council presence tend to favor 
sectoral collective bargaining status and conversely in the case of market competition and 
export propensity. However, the evidence is weaker than in simple cross-section studies, 
while the correlates of firm-level bargaining emerge as quite distinct. Changes in collective 
bargaining status are intriguing in the sense of offering  very mixed support for our priors 
both as regards joining sectoral and firm-level agreements and leaving firm-level agreements. 
Little support is adduced for any of our regressors (other than the industry dummies) in the 
case of establishments abandoning sectoral agreements. 
Works council introduction and abandonment appears both better determined and 
more symmetric, even if the associations uncovered here are again not always consistent with 
those reported in the literature. A final issue is the collective bargaining-works council nexus. 
Works councils are positively associated with collective bargaining presence but in terms of 
switching only with the introduction of firm-level agreements. And the presence of collective 
agreements tends to favor the introduction of works councils and detract from their 
abandonment. Overall, the suggestion is that the two entities play a supportive role  
The British and German systems are fundamentally different. In particular, sectoral-
level bargaining is the ‘default’ in Germany whereas, by the start of our period of 
investigation, it had all but disappeared in the British private sector. Instead, in the vast 
majority of British firms it is management that sets pay unilaterally rather than resorting to 
collective bargaining. 
In contrast to Germany, British firms can combine sectoral and firm-level bargaining. 
In practice, however, we do not observe mix and match. Nearly all the firms setting some pay 
with collective bargaining used either sectoral or firm-level bargaining. Among those using 
collective bargaining, firm-level bargaining is more common than sectoral-level bargaining. 
As in Germany, collective bargaining was in decline over the period 1998-2004. In 
Britain this was most evident in sectoral-level bargaining. But, unlike the situation in 
Germany, Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) were also in conspicuous decline over this 
period. Much of the decline in collective bargaining is accounted for by compositional 
change in workplaces: those workplaces leaving the population, either because they died or 
had shrunk below the size threshold for inclusion in the survey, had higher rates of collective 
bargaining than new workplaces that had either been born since 1998 or had grown above the 
lower size threshold. Change among continuing establishments was much less pronounced. 
The amount of switching in and out of collective bargaining among British panel 
establishments is considerable. Nevertheless, there is substantial persistence in collective 
bargaining status, as indicated by the large positive effects of lagged bargaining status in the 
regression analysis. Switching is less common when one uses the measure of union 
recognition to proxy union involvement in pay bargaining. And the proportion of 
establishments introducing and abolishing JCCs is much higher than the switching in 
collective bargaining status.  
Finally, much of the variance in collective bargaining status can be captured with 
workplace-level covariates obtained some six to seven years previously but the bottom line is 
that the correlates of sectoral and firm-level bargaining differ quite markedly. 
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Table 1 
Transitions in the Collective Bargaining and Works Council Status of German Establishments between 1998 and 2004,  
Weighted Data 
 
  Works council Collective bargaining of 
any type 
Sectoral collective 
bargaining 
Firm-level collective 
bargaining  
Incomplete 
panel 
Complete 
panel 
Incomplete 
panel 
Complete  
panel 
Incomplete 
panel 
Complete 
panel 
Incomplete 
panel 
Complete 
panel 
Always existing 6.7% 7.3% 42.6% 44.4% 39.3% 40.5% 1.3% 2.0%
Introduced 1.7% 2.5% 4.2%        2.8% 4.9% 3.1% 1.2% 1.7%
Abolished 2.0% 2.5% 15.6% 15.2% 15.2% 14.7% 2.4% 2.5%
Never existing 89.7% 87.7% 37.6% 37.5% 40.6% 41.8% 95.0% 93.8%
Net change -0.3% 0.0% -11.4% -12..4% -10.3% -11.7% -1.2% -0.7%
Number of observations 318,561 184,021 318,561 184,021 318,561 184,021 318,561 184,021
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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Table 2   
Probit Pooled Estimates of the Determinants of Collective Bargaining (Any Type, Sectoral, and Firm-
Level), Germany, 1998 and 2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Collective bargaining 
of any type 
Sectoral collective 
bargaining 
Firm-level collective 
bargaining  
Year (2004) -0.301*** -0.259*** -0.170* 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.099) 
Log establishment size  0.160** 0.148**  0.057 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.089) 
Increasing sales expected  0.046  0.083 -0.185 
 (0.137) (0.132) (0.143) 
High-tech  0.066  0.047  0.106 
 (0.124) (0.122) (0.106) 
Age of establishment   0.345**  0.309**  0.118 
 (0.150) (0.146) (0.172) 
Exports -0.009* -0.013**  0.0137*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Single plant -0.225 -0.166 -0.098 
 (0.214) (0.196) (0.129) 
R&D -0.327 -0.238 -0.227 
 (0.219) (0.211) (0.183) 
Delegation  0.383**  0.379** -0.125 
 (0.183) (0.173) (0.179) 
Team-work  0.200  0.246 -0.208 
 (0.196) (0.184) (0.190) 
Profit-center -0.119 -0.103 -0.022 
 (0.215) (0.197) (0.163) 
 Skilled workers  0.0020  0.00244  0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Female workers  0.002  0.0003  0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Fixed-term workers -0.014** -0.013** -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Part-time workers -0.0007  0.0002 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Works council present  1.281***  0.759***  0.674*** 
 (0.159) (0.169) (0.180) 
Individually-owned firm  0.106 0.101  0.041 
 (0.140) (0.138) (0.116) 
Foreign property -0.386 -0.695**  0.773** 
 (0.285) (0.279) (0.319) 
Western Germany  0.607*** 0.733*** -0.651*** 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.114) 
Constant -0.154     0.106    -3.177*** 
 (0.497) (0.504) (0.588) 
    
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.25 0.19 
n 3,067 3,084 3,066 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels.   
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 1998 and 2004. 
34 
 
Table 3 
Probit Estimates of End-Period (i.e. 2004) Collective Bargaining Status, Germany, Weighted Data (the 
determinants are beginning-period (i.e. 1998) establishment characteristics) 
 
 Collective bargaining of 
any type 
Sectoral collective 
bargaining 
Firm-level collective 
bargaining 
Collective bargaining of any type  1.757***   
 (0.179)   
Sectoral collective bargaining   1.701***  
  (0.174)  
Firm-level collective bargaining    2.232*** 
   (0.377) 
Log establishment size  0.198**  0.217**  0.037 
 (0.090) (0.088) (0.108) 
Increasing sales expected -0.014  0.087 -0.728*** 
 (0.161) (0.162) (0.192) 
High-tech  0.454***  0.551*** -0.379** 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.188) 
Age of establishment  -0.143 -0.142 -0.0004 
 (0.186) (0.183) (0.211) 
Exports  0.007 -0.0008  0.0142** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Single plant  0.260  0.379* -0.459** 
 (0.228) (0.224) (0.226) 
R&D -0.392 -0.544**  0.577** 
 (0.279) (0.272) (0.281) 
Delegation  0.534**  0.414  0.443* 
 (0.258) (0.269) (0.230) 
Team-work  0.060 0.137 -0.257 
 (0.269) (0.272) (0.245) 
Profit-center -0.374* -0.283 -0.284 
 (0.222) (0.222) (0.250) 
 Skilled workers  0.004  0.005* -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Female workers  0.009**  0.010** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Fixed-term workers  0.003  0.004  0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) 
Part-time workers -0.007* -0.009**  0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Works council present  0.244  0.079  0.841*** 
 (0.232) (0.234) (0.314) 
Individually-owned firm  0.085  0.156 -0.415 
 (0.190) (0.192) (0.256) 
Foreign property  0.505  0.276  0.436 
 (0.397) (0.272) (0.427) 
Profit sharing  0.147  0.185 -0.302 
 (0.225) (0.226) (0.283) 
High competition  -0.260 -0.338**  0.432** 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.170) 
Western Germany  0.679***  0.788*** -0.895*** 
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.192) 
Constant -3.317***  -3.326***  -2.440* 
 (0.777) (0.746) (0.754) 
    
Pseudo R2 0.44 0.45 0.51 
n  1,624 1,624 1,494 
Note: See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Transitions into and out of the Various 
Collective Bargaining Regimes, Germany, Weighted Data 
 
 Collective bargaining of 
any type 
Sectoral collective 
bargaining  
Firm-level collective 
bargaining 
Introduced Abolished Introduced Abolished Introduced Abolished 
Log establishment size  0.345** -0.195  0.387*** -0.156 -0.005 -0.321* 
 (0.158) (0.121) (0.141) (0.125) (0.116) (0.179) 
Increasing sales expected -0.869*** -0.199 -0.502* -0.276 -0.537***  1.126*** 
 (0.303) (0.190) (0.264) (0.201) (0.194) (0.372) 
High-tech  1.093*** -0.394*  1.311*** -0.455** -0.456** 0.845* 
 (0.334) (0.212) (0.311) (0.217) (0.193) (0.461) 
Age of establishment  -1.013*** -0.122 -0.750*** -0.080 -0.153  1.917*** 
 (0.304) (0.215) (0.273) (0.228) (0.196) (0.581) 
Exports  0.005 -0.013 -0.028** -0.012  0.013**  0.002 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) 
Single plant  1.074** -0.099  0.837* -0.184 -0.492**  0.215 
 (0.523) (0.270) (0.440) (0.274) (0.250) (0.482) 
R&D -0.050  0.527 -0.894**  0.488  0.384 -1.504** 
 (0.360) (0.334) (0.405) (0.343) (0.270) (0.631) 
Delegation  1.209*** -0.374  1.107** -0.276  0.504**  0.038 
 (0.447) (0.236) (0.466) (0.244) (0.239) (0.599) 
Team-work  0.323 -0.0224 -0.013 -0.226 -0.077  0.697 
 (0.426) (0.279) (0.445) (0.301) (0.229) (0.494) 
Profit-center -0.441  0.250 -0.406  0.251 -0.139 -0.120 
 (0.427) (0.283) (0.419) (0.288) (0.288) (0.515) 
Skilled workers  0.013*** -0.003  0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004 (0.004) (0.008) 
Female workers  0.017** -0.007  0.021*** -0.007  0.002  0.020* 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 
Fixed-term workers -0.016 -0.0109 -0.011 -0.016  0.006  0.036* 
 (0.022) (0.0113) (0.018) (0.013) (0.008) (0.019) 
Part-time workers  0.006  0.009** -0.006  0.020**  0.0009 -0.023** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) 
Works council  0.114 -0.172  0.286  0.074  0.998*** -0.587 
 (0.652) (0.260) (0.538) (0.263) (0.326) (0.531) 
Individually-owned firm  0.168 -0.152  0.209 -0.207 -0.466  0.027 
 (0.340) (0.221) (0.309) (0.235) (0.292) (0.575) 
Foreign property  1.575*** -0.105  1.337*** -0.697  0.669  0.101 
 (0.586) (0.455) (0.495) (0.501) (0.466) (0.601) 
Profit sharing -0.442 -0.385 -0.858** -0.398 -0.581* -1.134* 
 (0.446) (0.275) (0.432) (0.289) (0.347) (0.604) 
High competition  -0.937*** 0.142 -0.593**  0.207  0.359** -0.721* 
 (0.291) (0.197) (0.272) (0.208) (0.177) (0.389) 
Western Germany  0.571** -0.575*** 1.207*** -0.671*** -1.176*** -0.340 
 (0.287) (0.196) (0.304) (0.204) (0.198) (0.596) 
Constant -5.128*** 1.603*    -4.509***   1.886**    -2.411***   2.572    
 (1.637) (0.893)     (1.278)     (0.861)     (0.884)    (1.915)      
       
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.20 0.41 0.23 0.43 0.72 
n  418 1,088 613 919 1,234 153 
Note: See notes to Table 2. 
36 
 
Table 5 
Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Transitions into and out of Works Council 
Status, Germany, Weighted Data 
 
 Introduced 
     (1) 
Abolished 
     (2) 
Log establishment size  0.657*** -2.445*** 
 (0.143) (0.391) 
Increasing sales expected -0.734** -1.307** 
 (0.303) (0.566) 
High-tech  0.837**  1.659*** 
 (0.368) (0.477) 
Age of establishment   0.0509 -1.074** 
 (0.355) (0.499) 
Exports  0.007  0.011 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
Single plant -0.024  1.302*** 
 (0.342) (0.404) 
R&D  0.853** -1.947*** 
 (0.394) (0.686) 
Delegation  0.437  0.793* 
 (0.483) (0.410) 
Team-work -1.031**  0.365 
 (0.523) (0.434) 
Profit-center -0.113  0.846* 
 (0.494) (0.462) 
Skilled workers  0.003 -0.0103* 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Female workers  0.027*** -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Fixed-term workers  0.005  0.103*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) 
Part-time workers -0.030*** -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Individually-owned firm -2.933***  2.277*** 
 (0.672) (0.763) 
Foreign property  1.408** -2.547** 
 (0.578) (1.226) 
Profit sharing  0.259 -0.382 
 (0.391) (0.501) 
High competition  -0.232 -0.974** 
 (0.358) (0.470) 
Western Germany  0.174  0.251 
 (0.392) (0.489) 
Sectoral agreements  0.555 -1.731*** 
 (0.367) (0.524) 
Firm-level agreements  1.208*** -0.798 
 (0.432) (0.589) 
Constant -13.360***   13.864***    
 (1.058) (2.793)     
   
Pseudo R2 0.57 0.77 
n  487 586 
Note: See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 6 
Workplace Incidence of Collective Bargaining, Great Britain, 1998-2004 
 
 Union 
recognition 
Any collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Joint 
Consultative 
Committee 
1998 (%) 20.4 16.6 5.6 11.0 36.3 (14.3) 
2004 (%) 14.8 10.6 2.3 8.4 29.4 (9.5) 
∆ -5.6 -6.0 -3.3 -2.6 -6.9 (-4.8) 
Notes: (1) ∆ denotes percentage point change. (2) Firm agreements include those at workplace and at 
organization level. (3)  JCC figures are for all JCCs whether at workplace or organization level; 
figures in parentheses are workplace-level JCCs. (4) All figures are workplace-weighted. (5) 
Unweighted workplace sample sizes in 1998 are 1469 for collective bargaining, 1,460 for union 
recognition, and 1,494 for JCC. (6) Unweighted workplace sample sizes in 2004 are 1,458 for 
collective bargaining, 1,428 for union recognition, and 1,489 for JCC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Employee Coverage by Worker Representation and Collective Bargaining, Great 
Britain, 1998-2004 
 
 Union 
recognition 
Any collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Joint 
Consultative 
Committee 
1998 (%) 38.7 26.9 4.6 22.3 50.8 (33.2) 
2004 (%) 32.2 21.3 4.1 17.2 48.6 (32.7) 
∆ -6.5 -5.6 -0.5 -4.1 -2.2 (-0.5) 
Notes: (1) All figures are employee weighted.  See also notes to Table 6. 
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Table 8 
Behavioral Versus Compositional Change, Great Britain, 1998-2004 
 
 Union 
recognition 
Any 
collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Joint 
consultative 
committee 
Stayers      
Cross-section: 
  1998 
  2004 
  ∆ 
Panel: 
  1998 
  2004 
  ∆ 
 
21.0 
18.1 
-2.9 
 
22.2 
24.2 
+2.0 
 
16.0 
12.1 
-3.9 
 
17.3 
20.0 
+2.7 
 
5.5 
2.0 
-3.5 
 
5.7 
9.4 
+3.7 
 
10.5 
10.0 
-0.5 
 
11.5 
11.4 
-0.1 
 
39.7 (15.5) 
30.2 (11.0) 
-9.5 (-4.5) 
 
38.5 (15.8) 
41.4 (17.0) 
+2.6 (1.2) 
Changers      
Leavers 1998 
Joiners 2004 
∆ 
19.1 
7.5 
-11.6 
17.9 
7.1 
-10.8 
6.0 
2.9 
-3.1 
12.1 
4.8 
-7.3 
28.7 (11.6) 
27.4 (6.3) 
-1.3 (-5.3) 
Notes: (1) ∆ denotes percentage point change. (2) Cross-section stayers are defined using survey data 
on workplace age and size. 1998 stayers are those workplaces surveyed in 1998 that were still in 
existence in 2004 with 10 or more employees. 2004 stayers are those workplaces surveyed in 2004 
that had been in existence with 10 or more employees in 1998. (3) All panel cases are ‘stayers’ since 
they had 10 or more employees in both 1998 and 2004. (4) Leavers are workplaces with 10 or more 
employees surveyed in 1998 that subsequently closed before 2004, or whose employment size had 
shrunk below 10 by 2004. Joiners are workplaces with 10 or more employees surveyed in 2004 that 
were either born after 1998 or had been in existence with fewer than 10 employees in 1998. (5) 
Unweighted workplace sample sizes are as follows: panel between 575 and 587 depending on 
workplace measure; 1998 stayers = 1,202; 1998 leavers = 292; 2004 stayers = 1,206; 2004 joiners = 
280. 
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Table 9 
Switching Behavior in Panel Workplaces, Great Britain, 1998-2004 
 
 Union 
recognition 
Any 
collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Joint 
Consultative 
Committee 
Always (%) 19.7 8.5 1.2 4.3 22.8 (7.0) 
Introduced (%) 4.1 11.9 8.2 7.1 18.3 (10.1) 
Abolished (%) 2.4 8.7 4.5 7.2 15.7 (8.8) 
Never (%) 73.9 70.9 86.2 81.5 43.2 (74.2) 
   ∆ +1.7 +3.2 +3.7 -0.1 +2.6 (+1.3) 
Notes: (1) ∆ denotes percentage point change. (2) Unweighted sample size is between 568 and 587 
depending on workplace measure. 
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Table 10 
Probit Estimates for Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining, Great Britain, 
Pooled Data for WERS Panel 1998-2004 
 
 
 
Recognition 
 
Any 
collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Year (2004) -0.022  0.159  0.344 -0.064 
 (0.085) (0.166) (0.251) (0.175) 
Log establishment size  0.267***  0.262*** -0.012  0.395*** 
 (0.099) (0.084) (0.110) (0.069) 
Single plant -0.301 -0.267  0.234 -0.903*** 
 (0.266) (0.212) (0.194) (0.232) 
U.K. ownership  0.253  0.314*  0.345  0.300* 
 (0.241) (0.176) (0.277) (0.166) 
Local market  0.433**  0.621***  0.417*  0.471*** 
 (0.201) (0.193) (0.225) (0.171) 
Female workers  0.902 -0.500 -0.335 -0.280 
 (0.563) (0.356) (0.414) (0.354) 
Fixed-term workers -0.063  0.281  0.482*  0.024 
 (0.123) (0.201) (0.247) (0.160) 
Team work -0.093 -0.322**  0.039 -0.571*** 
 (0.142) (0.155) (0.181) (0.163) 
No. of contingent pay practices -0.071 -0.256*** -0.340*** -0.089 
 (0.070) (0.066) (0.109) (0.077) 
JCC  0.731***  0.477***  0.241  0.546*** 
 (0.152) (0.155) (0.173) (0.168) 
Constant -1.511*** -1.581*** -1.852*** -2.053*** 
 (0.564) (0.399) (0.481) (0.423) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.22  0.21  0.28 
n 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors clustered to account for repeated observations are in parentheses. All models include 
10 single-digit industry dummies. Controls are as follows. Year (2004): year dummy; Log 
establishment size: log number of employees at workplace; Single plant: dummy for single 
establishment; U.K ownership: dummy for U.K. ownership; Local market: dummy for local 
product/service market (the default category is regional, national, and international markets); Female 
workers: percentage of  employees female; Fixed-term workers: dummy for any temporary or fixed-
term employees; Team work: 60% or more of employees in largest occupational group work in teams; 
No. of contingent pay practices: count  of contingent pay practices (profit-related pay, deferred profit-
sharing, employee share ownership, individual or group performance-related pay, and other cash 
bonuses); and JCC dummy for presence of a JCC at workplace or organizational level. 
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Table 11 
Probit Estimates for Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining Status in 2004 
Conditioning on 1998 Covariates, Great Britain, WERS Panel 1998-2004 
 
 
 
Recognition 
 
Any collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Log establishment size  0.346***  0.152  0.027  0.276** 
 (0.102) (0.132) (0.175) (0.130) 
Single plant -0.220  0.355  0.295  0.069 
 (0.260) (0.263) (0.286) (0.277) 
U.K. ownership  1.028***  0.247  0.225  0.266 
 (0.286) (0.212) (0.373) (0.252) 
Family owned -0.967*** -0.666** -0.648* -0.539* 
 (0.292) (0.307) (0.383) (0.305) 
Establishment age -0.49* -0.387* -0.281 -0.275 
 (0.250) (0.224) (0.258) (0.224) 
Occupation 1 -0.447  0.599  1.667*** -0.343 
 (0.473) (0.444) (0.598) (0.441) 
Occupation 2  0.073 -0.065  0.766 -0.728* 
 (0.600) (0.422) (0.615) (0.429) 
Occupation 3 -0.114  0.089  0.189  0.004 
 (0.400) (0.438) (0.477) (0.490) 
Occupation 4 -1.270***  0.233 -0.185 -0.030 
 (0.482) (0.416) (0.504) (0.413) 
Occupation 5 -0.071 -0.670* -0.631 -0.901* 
 (0.550) (0.401) (0.662) (0.538) 
Occupation 6 -0.153  0.169  0.224 -0.469 
 (0.401) (0.433) (0.516) (0.426) 
Occupation 7  0.642*  0.181  0.271 -0.225 
 (0.379) (0.389) (0.438) (0.426) 
Female workers -0.002 -0.007 -0.020**  0.006 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Part-time workers  0.004  0.003  0.024** -0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) 
Fixed-term workers -0.125  0.099  0.104 -0.140 
 (0.211) (0.247) (0.341) (0.223) 
Local market  0.029  0.299  0.707** -0.213 
 (0.303) (0.281) (0.345) (0.266) 
JCC  0.522** -0.047 -0.296  0.271 
 (0.224) (0.219) (0.263) (0.203) 
Team work -0.022 -0.133 -0.233  0.083 
 (0.225) (0.237) (0.297) (0.226) 
No. contingent pay practices -0.199* -0.193 -0.347** -0.076 
 (0.109) (0.123) (0.148) (0.091) 
London -0.294 -0.699** -1.431*** -0.53* 
 (0.232) (0.279) (0.529) (0.320) 
Union recognition  2.808***    
 (0.249)    
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Any collective bargaining   0.936***   
  (0.266)   
Sectoral collective bargaining    0.176  
   (0.474)  
Firm-level collective bargaining     1.105*** 
    (0.248) 
Constant -3.136*** -1.600** -2.667*** -1.804*** 
 (0.694) (0.776) (0.963) (0.853) 
     
Pseudo R2  0.699  0.256 0.377  0.285 
n  584  572 566  584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors clustered to account for repeated observations are in parentheses. All models include 8 
single-digit industry dummies. Controls are all measured in 1998 and are as follows. Log 
establishment size: log number of employees at workplace; Single plant: dummy for single 
establishment; U.K ownership: dummy for U.K. ownership; Family owned: dummy for family 
owned; Establishment age: a dummy for establishment aged 25 or more years; Occupation variables 
identify the largest non-managerial occupational group in the workplace where 1 = professionals, 2 = 
scientific/technical; 3 = clerical/secretarial; 4 = craft and skilled manual; 5 = personal service; 6 = 
sales; 7 = operative and assembly and reference is routine unskilled manual; Local market: dummy for 
local product/service market (the default category is regional, national, and international markets); 
Female workers: percentage of employees female; Fixed-term workers: dummy for any temporary or 
fixed-term employees; Team work: 60% or more of employees in largest occupational group work in 
teams; No. of contingent pay practices: count  of contingent pay practices (profit-related pay, deferred 
profit-sharing, employee share ownership, individual or group performance-related pay, and other 
cash bonuses); London: dummy for location in London; and JCC: dummy for presence of  a JCC at 
workplace or organizational level. 
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Table 12 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Union Recognition Status, Great Britain, 1998-2004 (reference category 
is no recognition in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.516  0.890***  0.694*** 
 (0.422) (0.199) (0.230) 
Single plant -1.714 -0.716 -0.848 
 (1.109) (0.691) (0.523) 
U.K. ownership -0.196  2.797***  1.463** 
 (1.689) (0.719) (0.584) 
Family owned -3.259* -3.008*** -1.893*** 
 (1.773) (1.080) (0.614) 
Establishment age  1.291* -1.212*  0.170 
 (0.778) (0.674) (0.422) 
Occupation 1  0.586 -0.797 -0.612 
 (1.517) (0.994) (1.034) 
Occupation 2  0.594 -0.141 -0.461 
 (1.764) (1.211) (0.831) 
Occupation 3 -0.926 -1.079  0.790 
 (1.223) (1.200) (0.851) 
Occupation 4 1.998 -2.986***  0.521 
 (1.606) (1.123) (0.864) 
Occupation 5 -1.061 -0.72 -0.899 
 (1.884) (1.358) (1.055) 
Occupation 6 -0.274 -0.025 -0.327 
 (1.363) (0.829) (0.754) 
Occupation 7 -1.597  0.904  1.234 
 (1.808) (0.765) (0.797) 
Female workers  0.029  0.004  0.017 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.012) 
Part-time workers -0.003  0.003  0.006 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
Fixed-term workers -0.095 -0.007 -0.117 
 (0.666) (0.574) (0.486) 
Local market  3.088***  0.567  1.631*** 
 (1.151) (0.760) (0.518) 
JCC -0.414  0.726  1.326*** 
 (0.657) (0.645) (0.480) 
Team work -0.287 -0.24 -0.177 
 (0.757) (0.519) (0.420) 
No. of contingent pay practices -0.179 -0.527* -0.27 
 (0.268) (0.298) (0.186) 
London -33.969*** -1.612** -1.044* 
 (0.875) (0.696) (0.579) 
Constant -6.958** -6.967*** -6.594*** 
 (2.921) (1.476) (1.419) 
Pseudo R2  0.45 
n 584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies. See also notes 
to Table 11. 
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Table 13 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Collective Bargaining Status, Great Britain, 1998-2004 (reference 
category is no collective bargaining in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.696***  0.058  0.744*** 
 (0.228) (0.380) (0.206) 
Single plant -1.039  0.495 -0.881 
 (0.706) (0.542) (0.621) 
U.K. ownership  0.024  1.348* -0.117 
 (0.896) (0.720) (0.465) 
Family owned  0.427 -1.249* -0.813 
 (0.680) (0.685) (0.649) 
Establishment age  0.382 -0.894  0.110 
 (0.513) (0.608) (0.405) 
Occupation 1 -2.076  0.222  2.001 
 (1.297) (0.932) (1.395) 
Occupation 2  0.055 -0.843  0.550 
 (1.143) (1.040) (0.897) 
Occupation 3  0.263 -0.206  0.902 
 (1.120) (0.928) (0.770) 
Occupation 4  1.148  0.585  0.158 
 (1.175) (0.886) (0.929) 
Occupation 5 -1.824 -2.451**  1.107 
 (1.135) (1.129) (1.129) 
Occupation 6  1.001  1.202 -0.197 
 (0.966) (0.865) (0.850) 
Occupation 7  1.855  0.518  1.189 
 (1.236) (0.888) (0.858) 
Female workers  0.008 -0.007 -0.028** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Part-time workers  0.013 -0.022  0.047*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) 
Fixed-term workers -0.217 0.476 -0.135 
 (0.599) (0.567) (0.436) 
Local market  1.719***  1.520**  0.795 
 (0.532) (0.698) (0.583) 
JCC  1.425*** -0.099  1.200*** 
 (0.526) (0.541) (0.427) 
Team work  0.687  0.067 -0.231 
 (0.546) (0.643) (0.438) 
No. of contingent pay practices -0.504** -0.733*** -0.241 
 (0.242) (0.267) (0.206) 
London -2.392*** -2.430*** -1.538** 
 (0.687) (0.913) (0.653) 
Constant -6.183*** -2.046 -6.598*** 
 (1.778) (2.175) (1.414) 
Pseudo R2 0.37 
n 572 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies. See also notes to Table 
11.
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Table 14 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Sectoral Collective Bargaining Status, Great Britain, 
1998-2004 (reference category is no sectoral collective bargaining in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.170 -0.667  1.117*** 
 (0.316) (0.565) (0.406) 
Single plant -2.018*  0.732 -0.786 
 (1.166) (0.714) (1.032) 
U.K. ownership  0.570  0.645  0.310 
 (1.788) (1.221) (1.390) 
Family owned  0.493 -0.834 -0.994 
 (0.806) (0.768) (0.955) 
Establishment age  0.060 -0.664  0.235 
 (0.838) (0.597) (0.716) 
Occupation 1 -4.477***  3.102**  2.618 
 (1.723) (1.238) (1.911) 
Occupation 2 -0.029  1.956  0.099 
 (1.226) (1.434) (2.517) 
Occupation 3  0.619 -0.144 -31.056*** 
 (0.994) (1.131) (1.158) 
Occupation 4 -0.546 -0.819 -1.427 
 (1.015) (1.361) (1.846) 
Occupation 5 -5.484*** -3.797  0.494 
 (1.631) (2.598) (1.654) 
Occupation 6 -0.017  0.143 -32.278*** 
 (1.142) (1.064) (1.893) 
Occupation 7 -2.067*  0.048  0.908 
 (1.174) (1.142) (1.571) 
Female workers  0.009 -0.049** -0.038** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) 
Part-time workers  0.021  0.057**  0.021 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.022) 
Fixed-term workers  0.181  1.211 -0.791 
 (0.863) (0.923) (1.326) 
Local market  1.032  2.224**  0.397 
 (0.723) (0.973) (1.230) 
JCC  0.422  0.169 -1.684* 
 (0.829) (0.700) (0.907) 
Team work  1.510* -0.441 -0.707 
 (0.900) (0.719) (0.864) 
No. of contingent pay practices -1.003** -0.707** -1.189** 
 (0.450) (0.285) (0.574) 
London -2.387** -2.517** -33.21*** 
 (1.077) (1.104) (1.925) 
Sic1  2.222  4.768* -0.416 
 (1.550) (2.508) (1.149) 
Sic2  3.981***  6.535***  3.788*** 
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 (1.391) (2.468) (1.187) 
Sic3 -1.339  2.919 -33.047*** 
 (1.350) (1.882) (1.047) 
Sic4 -34.897***  2.906** -33.338*** 
 (1.035) (1.227) (0.956) 
Sic5 -3.021  6.036** -33.538*** 
 (2.236) (2.580) (1.391) 
Sic6  1.437  7.937*** -28.889*** 
 (1.586) (2.619) (2.996) 
Sic7 -1.743  3.176** -2.846* 
 (1.132) (1.558) (1.682) 
Constant -5.283** -4.857** -5.647** 
 (2.272) (2.265) (2.276) 
Pseudo R2 0.44 
n 566 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. SIC variables are the standard industry classification codes as 
follows. Sic1: Manufacture and Utilities; Sic2: Construction; Sic3: Wholesale and Retail; Sic4: Hotels 
and Restaurants; Sic5: Transport and Communication; Sic6: Financial Services; Sic7: Other business 
services. The Sic reference category is Education, Health, and Other Community Services. See also 
notes to Table 11 
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Table 15 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Firm Collective Bargaining Status, Great Britain, 
1998-2004 (reference category is no firm collective bargaining in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.616***  0.418  0.968*** 
 (0.234) (0.309) (0.203) 
Single plant -0.865  0.411 -1.820*** 
 (0.564) (0.590) (0.697) 
U.K. ownership -0.202  0.882 -0.459 
 (0.602) (0.647) (0.471) 
Family owned  0.073 -1.331* -0.279 
 (0.733) (0.696) (0.688) 
Establishment age  0.371 -0.799  0.685 
 (0.560) (0.546) (0.499) 
Occupation 1 -0.427 -1.432  1.079 
 (1.623) (1.107) (1.016) 
Occupation 2  0.116 -1.822*  0.000 
 (1.506) (0.951) (0.870) 
Occupation 3 -0.596 -0.312  0.812 
 (1.126) (0.986) (0.821) 
Occupation 4  1.781  0.049  0.498 
 (1.256) (0.768) (1.031) 
Occupation 5  0.745 -2.377  0.678 
 (1.279) (1.458) (1.087) 
Occupation 6  0.801 -0.909 -0.462 
 (0.938) (0.922) (1.179) 
Occupation 7  3.383***  0.164  1.416* 
 (1.280) (0.861) (0.757) 
Female workers -0.010  0.006 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) 
Part-time workers  0.036* -0.029*  0.025* 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) 
Fixed-term workers -1.037** -0.855  0.375 
 (0.474) (0.546) (0.480) 
Local market  1.390** -0.007  0.491 
 (0.642) (0.641) (0.580) 
JCC  1.212**  0.531  1.768*** 
 (0.556) (0.478) (0.434) 
Team work  0.198  0.824 -0.839** 
 (0.490) (0.600) (0.406) 
No. of contingent pay practices  0.232 -0.188  0.146 
 (0.259) (0.221) (0.217) 
London -2.375*** -2.174** -0.342 
 (0.841) (1.001) (0.611) 
Constant -7.026*** -2.590 -7.811*** 
 (1.932) (2.316) (1.273) 
Pseudo R2 0.39 
n 584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies. See also notes to Table 
11.
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Table 16 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Joint Consultative Committee Status, Great Britain, 
1998-2004 (reference category is no JCC in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size -0.027  0.213  0.522** 
 (0.302) (0.226) (0.251) 
Single plant -1.154* -0.843* -2.420*** 
 (0.668) (0.502) (0.574) 
U.K. ownership  0.111 -2.163***  0.014 
 (0.642) (0.572) (0.542) 
Family owned -1.046** -1.372** -2.657*** 
 (0.502) (0.574) (0.577) 
Establishment age -0.662 -1.818***  0.224 
 (0.492) (0.489) (0.463) 
Occupation 1  0.804 -0.855  0.262 
 (1.140) (0.897) (0.943) 
Occupation 2  1.358 -1.734 -0.659 
 (1.006) (1.393) (0.986) 
Occupation 3  0.775 -1.083  0.571 
 (0.981) (0.728) (0.782) 
Occupation 4  1.179 -0.273  0.894 
 (0.876) (0.890) (0.834) 
Occupation 5  1.031 -1.62 -0.768 
 (0.958) (1.001) (0.829) 
Occupation 6 -0.216 -0.158  1.455* 
 (1.012) (0.752) (0.780) 
Occupation 7 -0.747 -0.01 -0.039 
 (0.875) (0.803) (0.660) 
Female workers -0.018  0.015 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) 
Part-time workers  0.017 -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Fixed-term workers  0.455 -0.429 -0.427 
 (0.571) (0.540) (0.537) 
Local market -1.418** -0.225 -0.527 
 (0.699) (0.530) (0.489) 
Union recognition  1.019*  1.012*  1.537*** 
 (0.610) (0.605) (0.497) 
Team work -0.281  0.180 -0.228 
 (0.569) (0.467) (0.507) 
No. of contingent pay practices  0.328  0.001  0.069 
 (0.263) (0.180) (0.190) 
London -0.869 -0.071 -0.022 
 (0.890) (0.603) (0.758) 
Constant  0.052  2.582*  0.190 
 (1.973) (1.385) (1.700) 
Pseudo R2 0.31 
n 584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies. See also notes to Table 
11 for a description of all other regressors; the only difference here is the inclusion of union recognition (a 1/0 
dummy for the presence of a recognized union) and the excision of JCC. 
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Table 17 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Workplace-level Joint Consultative Committee Status, Great Britain, 
1998-2004 (reference category is no workplace JCC in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.893***  1.169***  1.495*** 
 (0.222) (0.200) (0.214) 
Single plant  0.528 -0.264  0.396 
 (0.621) (0.497) (0.552) 
U.K. ownership -0.56 -0.635  0.459 
 (0.580) (0.485) (0.533) 
Family owned  0.121 -0.643 -1.627** 
 (0.498) (0.487) (0.696) 
Establishment age  0.035 -0.573  0.140 
 (0.454) (0.444) (0.472) 
Occupation 1  2.733**  0.289 -0.601 
 (1.105) (0.731) (0.922) 
Occupation 2  1.587 -1.232 -0.712 
 (1.198) (1.139) (0.814) 
Occupation 3  1.896*  0.196  0.784 
 (1.107) (0.652) (0.831) 
Occupation 4  1.896*  0.007  1.052 
 (1.028) (0.683) (0.814) 
Occupation 5  0.721 -1.125 -2.004** 
 (1.243) (0.815) (1.008) 
Occupation 6 -0.364 -1.181  1.340 
 (1.690) (0.742) (0.943) 
Occupation 7 0.487 -0.78  0.189 
 (1.005) (0.653) (0.687) 
Female workers -0.006 -0.01 -0.008 
 (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) 
Part-time workers  0.018  0.001 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
Fixed-term workers  0.285 -0.405  0.714 
 (0.511) (0.383) (0.481) 
Local market -1.765*** -1.002** -0.738 
 (0.612) (0.452) (0.473) 
Union recognition  0.301  0.262 -0.106 
 (0.520) (0.456) (0.448) 
Team work  0.147  0.352  0.510 
 (0.481) (0.387) (0.434) 
No. of contingent pay practices  0.107  0.242 -0.013 
 (0.227) (0.193) (0.208) 
London -0.895  0.141  1.095** 
 (0.999) (0.538) (0.556) 
Constant -5.802*** -3.693*** -7.176*** 
 (1.944) (1.144) (1.366) 
Pseudo R2 0.25 
n 584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies and a constant. See also 
notes to Table 11 for a description of all other regressors; the only difference here is the inclusion of union 
recognition (a 1/0 dummy for the presence of a recognized union) and the excision of JCC 
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Figure 1 
The Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage of Establishments in Germany, 
1998-2004 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted data) 
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Figure 2 
The Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage of Employees in Germany, 
1998-2004 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted data) 
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Figure 3 
The Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage of Establishments in Germany, 
Permanent Stayers, 1998-2004 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section 
weighted data) 
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Figure 4 
The Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage of Employees in Germany, 
Permanent Stayers, 1998-2004 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section 
weighted data) 
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Appendix Table 1 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics of the Estimation Sample, Germany 
 
Variable Type Mean  S. D. n 
Any type of collective agreement Dummy 0.685 0.465 1,747 
Sectoral (i.e.multi-employer) collective agreement Dummy 0.583 0.493 1,747 
Firm-level collective agreement Dummy 0.102 0.303 1,747 
Introduction of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.142 0.349 550 
Introduction of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.133 0.340 728 
Introduction of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.043 0.202 1,569 
Abolition of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.190 0.382 1,197 
Abolition of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.216 0.412 1,019 
Abolition of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.522 0.500 178 
Works council presence Dummy 0.431 0.495 1,747 
Introduction of a works council between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.038 0.192 994 
                                  Abolition of a works council between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.076 0.265 753 
Establishment size (total number of employees; as of June30, 1998) log value 4.093 1.692 1,747 
Increasing sales expected Dummy 0.339 0.474 1,737 
High-tech (technology of equipment is high/very high) Dummy 0.026 0.159 1,745 
Delegation (of responsibilities to lower levels during the last 24 months) Dummy 0.288 0.453 1,731 
Team-work (introduction of team-work during the last 24 months) Dummy 0.224 0.417 1,731 
Profit-center (introduction of profit center during the last 24 months) Dummy 0.156 0.363 1,731 
 R&D (establishment or another unit within company is engaged in R&D) Dummy 0.260 0.439 1,744 
Skilled workers Proportion 65.203 26.840 1,746 
Female workers Proportion 35.820 29.226 1,742 
Part-time workers Proportion 13.870 20.966 1,741 
Fixed-term contract workers Proportion 3.929 9.878 1,741 
Legal form: individually-owned firm Dummy 0.198 0.399 1,736 
       Single establishment (independent company with no other place of business Dummy 0.722 0.448 1,744 
Age of establishment (founded before 1990) Dummy 0.539 0.499 1,743 
Exports Proportion 8.541 19.328 1,701 
Foreign property (foreign majority ownership [taken from 2004 data]} Dummy 0.083 0.276 1,725 
Presence of profit sharing schemes (in 1998) Dummy 0.157  0.364  1,747 
High competition (pressure from competition is ‘substantial’[in 1998]) Dummy 0.656  0.475  1,747 
West Germany (establishment located in western Germany) Dummy 0.463 0.499 1,747 
Industry dummies (32) Dummy - - 1,747 
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Appendix Table 2 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics of the Estimation Sample, Great Britain 
 
Variable Type Mean  S. D. n 
Any union recognition Dummy 0.380 0.486 587 
Any type of collective agreement Dummy 0.341 0.475 577 
Sectoral (i.e.multi-employer) collective agreement Dummy 0.071 0.257 580 
Firm-level collective agreement Dummy 0.271 0.445 587 
Introduction of union recognition between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.075 0.264 587 
Abolition of union recognition between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.031 0.173 587 
Retention of union recognition between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.349 0.477 587 
No union recognition between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.545 0.498 587 
Introduction of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.101 0.302 574 
Abolition of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.124 0.330 574 
Retention of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.218 0.413 574 
No  collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.558 0.497 574 
Introduction of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.055 0.227 568 
Abolition of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.049 0.217 568 
Retention of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.021 0.144 568 
No  sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.875 0.331 568 
Introduction of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.090 0.287 587 
Abolition of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.111 0.314 587 
Retention of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.160 0.367 587 
No  firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.639 0.481 587 
Any joint consultative committee Dummy 0.521 0.450 587 
Introduction of a JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.181 0.385 587 
                                  Abolition of a JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.141 0.349 587 
Retention of a JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.380 0.486 587 
No  JCC  between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.298 0.458 587 
Any workplace JCC Dummy 0.346 0.477 587 
Introduction of a workplace JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.179 0.384 587 
                                  Abolition of a workplace JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.119 0.324 587 
Retention of a workplace JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.227 0.419 587 
No  workplace JCC  between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.475 0.500 587 
Establishment size (total number of employees) Log value 4.726 1.212 587 
Team-work (60 percent or more of largest occupational group in teams) Dummy 0.652 0.477 587 
Percent female employees Percent 43.323 26.862 585 
Part-time workers Percent 21.361 27.058 585 
Any fixed-term or temporary contract workers Dummy 0.465 0.499 587 
       Single establishment (independent company with no other place of 
business) 
Dummy 0.273 0.446 587 
Age of establishment (founded before 1990) Dummy 0.356 0.479 587 
Market for main product/service is local Dummy 0.256 0.437 587 
U.K.-owned Dummy 0.768 0.422 587 
Family-owned Dummy 0.187 0.391 587 
Number of contingent pay schemes (share ownership, profit-related pay, 
deferred profit sharing, individual or group PBR, cash bonuses) 
Count 
(0,5) 
1.522 1.220 586 
London  (establishment located in London) Dummy 0.135 0.342 587 
Largest occupational group (8) Dummy   587 
Industry dummies (10) Dummy - - 587 
Note: Descriptive statistics are for 1998 baseline data, with the exception of switching status in 1998-2004  
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Appendix Table 3 
Number of Employees and Establishments Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils in Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted 
Data 
 
 Collective agreement status  
Works council 
 
Totals Sectoral agreement Firm agreement No agreement 
Year Establishments Employees Establishments Employees Establishments Employees Establishments Employees Establishments Employees 
1998 469,272 13,259,878 46,454 1,845,006 443,245 6,266,971 88,162 9,680,309 958,971 21,371,855 
48.9% 62.0% 4.8% 8.6% 46.2% 29.3% 9.2% 45.3%   
1999 453,854 12,667,567 28,870 1,687,144 459,346 6,660,295 88,850 9,648,126 942,070 21,015,006 
48.2% 60.3% 3.1% 8.0% 48.8% 31.7% 9.4% 45.9%   
2000 422,719 11,917,790 27,071 1,463,513 442,239 7,426,812 94,024 9,429,656 892,029 20,808,115 
47.4% 57.3% 3.0% 7.0% 49.6% 35.7% 10.5% 45.3%   
2001 400,009 11,805,583 29,086 1,664,439 430,685 7,089,134 89,922 9,536,473 859,780 20,559,156 
46.5% 57.4% 3.4% 8.1% 50.1% 34.5% 10.5% 46.4%   
2002 395,493 11,709,360 23,931 1,560,952 459,054 7,376,187 85,579 9,545,364 878,478 20,646,499 
45.0% 56.7% 2.7% 7.6% 52.3% 35.7% 9.7% 46.2%   
2003 377,128 11,439,852 25,392 1,673,711 471,057 7,508,745 79,948 9,310,295 873,577 20,622,308 
43.2% 55.5% 2.9% 8.1% 53.9% 36.4% 9.2% 45.1%   
2004 350,469 10,877,501 24,345 1,614,867 493,661 7,711,302 75,084 8,834,736 868,475 20,203,670 
40.4% 53.8% 2.8% 8.0% 56.8% 38.2% 8.6% 43.7%     
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
 
55 
 
Appendix Table 4 
Number of Employees and Establishments Not Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils but Acting upon a Collective 
Agreement, Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Acting upon collective agreement  
Overall numbers  Yes  No  Totals  
Year  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  
1999 205,905 3,265,817 239,557 3,194,755 445,462 6,460,572 942,070 21,015,006 
21.9% 15.5% 25.4% 15.2% 47.3% 30.7%   
2000 215,617 3,761,630 213,123 3,455,910 428,740 7,217,540 892,029 20,808,115 
24.2% 18.1% 23.9% 16.6% 48.1% 34.7%   
2001 192,599 3,517,545 207,954 3,097,784 400,553 6,615,329 859,780 20,559,156 
22.4% 17.1% 24.2% 15.1% 46.6% 32.2%   
2002 210,636 3,745,272 231,537 3,352,851 442,173 7,098,123 878,478 20,646,499 
24.0% 18.1% 26.4% 16.2% 50.3% 34.4%   
2003 232,241 3,820,184 213,870 3,245,989 446,111 7,066,173 873,577 20,622,308 
26.6% 18.5% 24.5% 15.7% 51.1% 34.3%   
2004 218,247 3,598,989 253,611 3,778,227 471,858 7,377,216 868,475 20,203,670 
25.1% 17.8% 29.2% 18.7% 54.3% 36.5%     
Note: Percentage values are based upon the overall number of establishments/employees. Because of missing values, the  totals of employers/employees are smaller 
compared with the total number of uncovered establishments/employees presented in Appendix Table 3. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations.
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Appendix Table 5 
Number of Employees and Establishments Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils, 
Permanent Stayers, Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Collective agreement status   
Works council  
 
Totals  Sectoral agreement  Firm agreement No agreement  
Year  Establishments  Employees  Establishments Employees Establishments Employees  Establishments Employees Establishments Employees 
1998 101,539 3,240,623 8,219 338,041 74,263 1,067,858 17,979 2,311,963 184,021 4,646,522 
55.2% 69.7% 4.5% 7.3% 40.4% 23.0% 9.8% 49.8%   
1999 89,075 2,947,818 4,429 236,590 80,336 1,192,041 17,619 2,241,176 173,840 4,376,449 
51.2% 67.4% 2.5% 5.4% 46.2% 27.2% 10.1% 51.2%   
2000 66,702 2,430,972 5,548 207,633 55,439 892,900 15,885 1,960,510 127,689 3,531,505 
52.2% 68.8% 4.3% 5.9% 43.4% 25.3% 12.4% 55.5%   
2001 56,516 2,159,535 4,476 263,964 49,862 837,889 13,768 1,830,756 110,854 3,261,388 
51.0% 66.2% 4.0% 8.1% 45.0% 25.7% 12.4% 56.1%   
2002 57,317 2,277,864 3,496 268,272 50,374 795,457 11,771 1,918,925 111,187 3,341,593 
51.6% 68.2% 3.1% 8.0% 45.3% 23.8% 10.6% 57.4%   
2003 53,374 2,293,113 2,808 273,965 51,508 816,232 13,398 2,029,893 107,690 3,383,310 
49.6% 67.8% 2.6% 8.1% 47.8% 24.1% 12.4% 60.0%   
2004 48,873 1,991,173 5,411 276,291 49,527 742,178 13,754 1,776,610 103,811 3,009,642 
47.1% 66.2% 5.2% 9.2% 47.7% 24.7% 13.2% 59.0%     
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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Appendix Table 6 
Number of Employees and Establishments Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils, 
Entrants, Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Collective agreement status  
Works council 
 
Totals  Sectoral agreement Firm agreement No agreement 
Year  Establishments  Employees  Establishments Employees Establishments Employees  Establishments Employees Establishments Employees 
1998 278,072 7,694,051 22,847 1,105,687 251,036 3,638,483 50,472 5,702,011 551,955 12,438,221 
50.4% 61.9% 4.1% 8.9% 45.5% 29.3% 9.1% 45.8%   
1999 101,031 2,479,482 7,792 275,098 102,509 1,481,099 17,017 1,713,606 211,332 4,235,679 
47.8% 58.5% 3.7% 6.5% 48.5% 35.0% 8.1% 40.5%   
2000 123,427 3,192,307 6,108 387,848 136,861 2,287,127 27,746 2,428,057 266,396 5,867,282 
46.3% 54.4% 2.3% 6.6% 51.4% 39.0% 10.4% 41.4%   
2001 75,202 1,981,450 7,051 335,458 98,157 1,546,608 15,382 1,678,426 180,410 3,863,516 
41.7% 51.3% 3.9% 8.7% 54.4% 40.0% 8.5% 43.4%   
2002 62,060 1,489,400 3,170 177,627 78,638 1,182,265 10,412 1,022,064 143,868 2,849,292 
43.1% 52.3% 2.2% 6.2% 54.7% 41.5% 7.2% 35.9%   
2003 58,150 1,292,368 5,670 221,410 94,789 1,294,635 12,463 901,964 158,609 2,808,413 
36.7% 46.0% 3.6% 7.9% 59.8% 46.1% 7.9% 32.1%   
2004 31,294 1,404,770 3,494 210,153 64,212 1,016,514 7,994 1,286,430 99,000 2,631,437 
31.6% 53.4% 3.5% 8.0% 64.9% 38.6% 8.1% 48.9%     
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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Appendix Table 7 
Number of Employees and Establishments Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils,  
Exits, Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Collective agreement status  
Works council 
 
Totals  Sectoral agreement Firm agreement No agreement 
Year  Establishments  Employees  Establishments Employees Establishments Employees  Establishments Employees Establishments Employees 
1998 89,660 2,325,204 15,389 401,278 117,945 1,560,630 19,756 1,666,335 222,994 4,287,112 
40.2% 54.2% 6.9% 9.4% 52.9% 36.4% 8.9% 38.9%   
1999 67,495 1,417,745 4,291 300,083 61,337 790,616 10,149 1,030,570 133,123 2,508,444 
50.7% 56.5% 3.2% 12.0% 46.1% 31.5% 7.6% 41.1%   
2000 43,843 1,047,473 4,503 166,125 48,014 793,086 96,360 2,006,684 96,360 2,006,684 
45.5% 52.2% 4.7% 8.3% 49.8% 39.5% 100.0% 100.0%   
2001 46,052 1,535,021 4,177 183,685 51,052 908,131 11,579 1,268,402 101,281 2,626,837 
45.5% 58.4% 4.1% 7.0% 50.4% 34.6% 11.4% 48.3%   
2002 56,401 1,521,910 8,032 293,909 65,879 984,222 16,283 1,351,303 130,312 2,800,041 
43.3% 54.4% 6.2% 10.5% 50.6% 35.2% 12.5% 48.3%   
2003 49,660 1,632,561 4,463 288,233 57,920 902,712 13,136 1,413,465 112,043 2,823,506 
44.3% 57.8% 4.0% 10.2% 51.7% 32.0% 11.7% 50.1%   
2004 44,482 1,119,542 2,308 197,490 69,510 878,276 7,584 932,824 116,300 2,195,308 
38.2% 51.0% 2.0% 9.0% 59.8% 40.0% 6.5% 42.5%     
Note: For each cross section we have two types of exit: exits of establishments populating the sample from earlier years and those establishments entering and 
leaving the sample in the given year. In 1998 we cannot distinguish the latter ‘mayflies’ from the former exits and therefore present the 1998 data in italics. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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